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Summary 
What is this report about? 
This report, commissioned by the National Joint Council for Local Authority Fire and Rescue 
Services (NJC), aims to identify what impact, if any, firefighters can have on the delivery of 
emergency medical response and wider community health interventions in the UK.  
What are the overall conclusions? 
Appropriately trained and equipped firefighters co-responding1 to targeted, specific time-
critical medical events, such as cardiac arrest, can improve patient survival rates. 
The data also indicate that there is support from fire service staff – and a potential need from 
members of the public, particularly the elderly, isolated or vulnerable – to expand ‘wider 
work’. This includes winter warmth assessments, Safe and Well checks, community 
defibrillator training and client referrals when staff believe someone may have dementia, are 
vulnerable or even, for example, have substance dependencies such as an alcohol addiction. 
However, there is currently insufficient data to estimate the net benefit of this work.  
How did the authors reach these conclusions?     
Alongside an analysis of existing data and a rapid evidence review of published literature, the 
authors carried out extensive first-hand research. This included:  
 A survey in which 42 of 50 fire and rescue services responded (32 were part of the NJC 
trial). The survey looked at the number and type of co-responding and wider work 
incidents that the fire and rescue services attended, as well as resources used, costs and 
equipment.  
 An economic evaluation that shows firefighters co-responding to time-critical incidents are 
associated with a faster response to the scene and therefore, assuming an immediate 
implementation of appropriate actions, there is the potential for corresponding gains in 
survival probability and life expectancy, as well as favourable value for money. The 
economic evaluation concluded that the benefits of firefighters carrying out co-responding 
are substantially greater than the costs, with a return on investment of between £5.67 and 
£14.40 per £1 invested.   
 A detailed look at a single county fire and rescue service and ambulance service. The 
national response time target for Red 1 and Red 22 calls for ambulance services is that 75% 
should be reached in eight minutes or less (DOH, 2015). However, due to increasing call 
demand, there has been a steady decline nationally in performance for several years 
                                                     
1 Co-responding is a scheme whereby appropriately trained and equipped fire and rescue service staff are 
mobilised to medical emergencies (as agreed with an NHS ambulance service) as part of a joint fire and rescue 
service and NHS response.  
 
2 Red 1 calls are the most time critical and cover cardiac arrest patients who are not breathing and do not have a 
pulse, and other severe conditions. Red 2 calls are serious but less immediately time critical and cover conditions 
such as stroke and fits. 
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(Nuffield Trust, 2016).  In this sub analysis of 100 cardiac arrests, firefighters achieved an 
eight-minute (or less) response in 66% of cases, while the ambulance service achieved an 
eight-minute (or less) response in 24% of cases. 
 An analysis of data from defibrillators used by a fire and rescue service during cardiac 
arrests. This revealed the quality of chest compressions and the impact of early 
interventions, in this case, the delivery of an electric shock to patients in cardiac arrest. 
Although a small sample, the results showed good rates of return of spontaneous 
circulation (getting the return of a sustainable heart rhythm with a palpable pulse, and 
significant respiratory effort) that would match well with international best-in-class 
systems. A larger trial is needed, but it is likely that co-responding with the fire and rescue 
services will improve cardiac arrest outcomes.  
 Telephone interviews with 26 different fire and rescue services taking part in the NJC 
trial. Participants unanimously agreed that co-responding should continue but that it must 
not impact (and within the interviewed services so far had not impacted) on ‘core 
business’, which was seen unconditionally as firefighting. The interviews revealed there 
was no standardisation of training, although agreed minimum levels appeared to have 
been achieved. The biggest concerns highlighted by staff were:  
o The difficulties experienced with relatives following fatalities. Staff sometimes felt 
unprepared and untrained for this aspect of the work, although some staff were 
able to respond very well in these circumstances. 
o Being dispatched to inappropriate incidents where they did not have the necessary 
skills to support the patient. 
o Waiting for an ambulance to arrive and having to provide care they were untrained 
for. 
 Wider work in health was most frequently linked to preventive work, such as Safe and Well 
checks and prevention and management of slips, trips and falls. 
Are there other specific findings? 
 International examples demonstrate the effectiveness of using the fire and rescue service 
for medical response.  
 When international cardiac arrest survival rates are compared, the UK ambulance service 
performs poorly. 
 Given that firefighters generally are highly trained for rapid intervention, expanding their 
role (requiring some additional education and training) to include serious medical 
emergencies looks likely to be in the public interest.  
 The fire and rescue services are able to reach incidents as a whole before ambulance 
services in 62% of cases based on the trial incident data. 
 In time-critical incidents, such as cardiac arrests, they arrive sooner than ambulances in 
93% of cases.3 
                                                     
3 It is important to note that these results are not necessarily representative of all jurisdictions, but they are a 
good indicator of trends.  
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 In relation to responding to medical emergencies, clinically, at this stage, it is difficult to 
envisage the fire and rescue services as more than co-responders with a tightly defined 
boundary of interventions, unless there is considerable upskilling in terms of clinical 
examination, assessment and treatment provision. In the short term, this reinforces the 
argument for utilising firefighters to co-respond to specific, targeted patient presentations 
such as those in cardiac/respiratory arrest. 
 Further work needs to be undertaken to establish what areas of wider health work is the 
most beneficial, both in humanitarian terms as well as cost efficacy. 
What does the report recommend?  
Recommendations include:  
 Support for fire and rescue services to co-respond with ambulance services in targeted 
cases such as cardiac arrest and potentially other cases that are immediately life-
threatening, such as respiratory arrest, convulsions, severe haemorrhage (both traumatic 
and medical cases) and other patients at high risk. 
 Explore the potential to expand the work in Safe and Well checks including work in 
prevention such as slips, trips and falls; dementia awareness; and other activities. 
 Change the fire and rescue service’s incident recording system of data collection to use 
definitions and categories aligned with other databases, allowing more specific and 
sensitive analysis of patient presentations such as those used by the ambulance service.  
This would enhance any audit of responses to specific patient conditions, and would 
facilitate future collaborative research between ambulance services and fire and rescue 
services. 
 Develop some ‘exemplar’ sites of best practice, where a strong commitment to research 
and evaluation can help drive the most effective models that positively influence patient 
care. 
 Establish work streams to promote national standards in training and equipment.  
 Explore how it might be feasible to speed up fire and rescue service activation.  
 Carry out further research to understand the definitive impact on patient outcomes and 
cost efficacy.  
 Collaborate with the NHS to ensure fire and rescue services are integrated with strategic 
health plans.  
 Consider if direct commissioning of fire and rescue services for co-responding and 
involvement in wider health work is the most appropriate way forward to ensure these 
activities are fully funded and embedded in appropriate clinical governance structures.     
10 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent years there has been consideration of encouraging a closer working relationship 
between the blue light services including, for example, the work of the Joint Emergency 
Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP).  More strategically, Sir Ken Knight’s 'Facing the 
Future’ review (Knight, 2013) and non-policy related publications such as Ellwood & Phillips 
(2013) have also been published.  Most recently, and since commencing this research, the 
government in England has implemented a duty for emergency services to collaborate through 
the Policing and Crime Act 2017.  However, prior to this recent legislation, the National Joint 
Council for Local Authority Fire and Rescue Services (NJC) had already begun trials to develop 
an agreement on emergency medical response (EMR) as a viable form of collaboration, with 
substantial potential benefits across the UK.  There is a growing consensus and a degree of 
logic to these ideas that provide for a more expansive role for the fire and rescue service (FRS) 
in the delivery of health care.  There are however, many questions to be answered in any 
proposed extension of responsibilities, and this evaluation is one important element to aid 
further consideration of this topic. 
It is notable that fire and rescue services have been particularly successful in applying 
preventive strategies to constrain demand; these approaches are urgently required in the 
context of ever increasing demand upon the National Health Service (NHS) generally and 
ambulance services in particular.  The evaluation presented here starts what is likely to be part 
of a long-term effort to determine how fire and rescue services move to supporting the 
communities they serve through potential growth in their role and in the delivery of a range of 
health care activities.  The potential spectrum of activities ranges from co-responding to 
cardiac arrest and other immediately life-threatening medical emergencies, where a very 
speedy response is likely to be an essential prerequisite for survival, through to involvement in 
preventative health actions, such as community risk assessments. As is often the case in early 
research, the available data is limited and must be treated with some caution but, as will be 
demonstrated, there are positive indications that this work is likely to be beneficial at a 
number of levels. Nevertheless further detailed evaluation will be necessary as the scope of 
activities increases. 
The success of programmes developed by fire and rescue services, through prevention and 
other societal factors, have resulted, as recognised by a number of national reports, in some 
'latent capacity’. To some extent this is likely to be inevitable, in that having a level of 
resources to meet their intrinsic requirement at a state of high readiness is logical and 
prudent.  Given that fire and rescue services, and firefighters generally, are highly trained and 
designed for rapid intervention roles, expanding this to include serious medical emergencies 
would seem to be in the interest of all.  Almost daily there are media reports indicating the 
immense pressure that health services are subject to generally and the Ambulance Service 
particularly. It is important to note that, while the data demonstrate a rapidly rising quantity of 
999 calls to ambulance services, only a small proportion (in the order of 5% ) are subsequently 
found actually to be immediately life-threatening, or serious from a medical point of view. 
Many others are ‘emergent,’ in that the patient may have subtle signs of deterioration that 
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may develop over time: this makes the quality of patient assessment, which would nearly 
always need to be conducted by a Paramedic or a Doctor, a key consideration.  Given this 
dynamic it would seem sensible to suggest that the well differentiated, life-threatening calls 
would be a good fit for potential fire and rescue service involvement.  Additionally there are 
many areas in preventive health, reflected in the Safe and Well checks, which appear to align 
with current fire prevention activities common within all fire and rescue services. It is 
therefore timely to consider what options may be available and what might be achieved 
through further ‘blue light collaboration,’ between fire and ambulance services in particular. 
Most countries realised this some time ago and developed arrangements whereby fire service 
assets can be mobilised rapidly to respond to serious medical emergencies as, currently, they 
generally have more available capacity than healthcare services to do so.  Modern 
computerised fail-safe technology enables firefighters, police officers and trained members of 
the public to provide some essential emergency treatment, such as defibrillation (providing a 
controlled electrical shock to some patients suffering cardiac arrest).  Figure 1 demonstrates 
the impact of early defibrillation using a computerised automatic external defibrillator (AED) of 
a type generally available in many fire services throughout the world, but which is not yet 
common practice in the UK.   
 
Figure 1: Cardiac arrest survival rates showing an increased probability of patient survival 
directly correlated in the speed that defibrillation can be effected, the implication being that co-
opting fire resources to provide early defibrillation will save lives (De Maio et al., 2003) 
 
When international survival rates are compared, the UK ambulance services perform poorly.  
This means that survival to hospital discharge from 28,000 out-of-hospital cardiac arrest cases 
in England has been reported at 8.6% (NHS England, 2014, the British Heart Foundation, NHS 
England and Resuscitation Council UK, 2014).  This is much lower than in other parts of the 
world.  One of the most successful examples worldwide is the Seattle Fire Department and the 
surrounding ‘King County’ systems, which demonstrate a survival rate of 20% for all cardiac 
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arrest rhythms and 50% for those presenting in ventricular fibrillation, for which defibrillation 
is the treatment of choice and where response times are a key factor in patient survival.  This 
is approximately double the best performing ambulance services in the UK.  If applied to the 
UK, then something in the order of 1,000-2,000 more lives would be saved annually.  Indeed, 
the 1996 Review of Ambulance Performance Standards estimated a similar level of survival 
could be accomplished if the 8-minute standard was met (NHS Executive, 1996). In the event, a 
lower level of compliance (set not at a 90% but at a 75% level) for emergency “red” calls 
remains in force today for both Red 1 and Red 2 calls4. 
With minimal additional emergency care training (in the order of 4-5 days), firefighters can 
relatively easily be given selective additional skills.  Typically, these revolve around emergency 
airway management, the administration of oxygen (with pertinent education around when it is 
not safe to use oxygen on a variety of acute medical patient presentations), and execution of 
other essential first aid actions including the control of external haemorrhage and the initial 
management of spinal injuries.  With further training and governance there may also be the 
potential to include the administration of pain relieving gases, such as Entonox within their 
role.   
Another example of this working in practice is in Melbourne, (Ambulance Services in Victoria, 
2013, Smith & McNeil, 2002 and Bernard, 2009) where fire and ambulance services remain 
distinct organisations but work closely together with Paramedics receiving basic fire and 
rescue skills enabling them to support fire crews, and fire crews receiving basic emergency 
care skills on the pattern outlined above.  Research has shown that Melbourne firefighters 
appreciate the relevance of emergency medical responding and find the work rewarding 
(Smith, et al 2001).  Nevertheless, at present, in the UK these opportunities remain largely 
unrealised. 
Collaboration and integration are likely to be a cornerstone of both fire and ambulance service 
modernisation in the future.  Ambulance services have a budget of something in the order of 
2% (£2.2 billion) of the NHS.  Closer collaboration might be expected to improve efficiency in 
the medium to long term.  Decisions taken by fire and ambulance Paramedic crews could have 
a major downstream effect that can influence spending in other parts of the NHS. This can best 
be appreciated if one considers the financial and, more importantly, the health and wellbeing 
benefit to patients of being treated effectively at home by a Paramedic with, perhaps, local 
primary care service support, rather than transport of patients to hospital emergency 
departments (Mason et al, 2007; Dixon et al, 2009; Snooks et al, 2014 and Bigham et al, 2013).  
Fire based community intervention programmes would make a contribution to this approach 
in time.   
In summary, emerging data from this research project suggest that, while accepting the 
limitations of the information available, fire and rescue services have a useful role to play at a 
number of points across the spectrum of patient need.  A key area is ‘co-responding’ or ‘fire 
                                                     
4 Red 1 calls are the most time critical and cover cardiac arrest patients who are not breathing and do not have a 
pulse, and other severe conditions. Red 2 calls are serious but less immediately time critical and cover conditions 
such as stroke and fits. 
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medical responding’, in order to attend patients rapidly and apply early defibrillation where 
appropriate and to provide first aid.  There are also a number of other patient groups where 
the early application of professional skills increasingly available to firefighters might make a 
difference to patient outcome, but this hypothesis would need to be tested in further research 
designed to determine if there is real benefit in this area.   
As one moves further down the acuity range to those patients who have no immediate threat 
to life into the areas of community based care and public health, there are a number of wider 
work initiatives being promoted within the fire and rescue services, particularly in the guise of 
Safe and Well checks or assistance to people who have fallen at home or who are at risk of 
falling.  This work also needs further investigation to look in greater detail at the impact upon 
patient/client outcome.  There may well be potential improvements in patient satisfaction 
alongside improved health outcomes from community based and prevention orientated 
intervention projects.  However, specific research, constructed for the purpose of measuring 
any effect is needed to resolve remaining ambiguities here.  Ensuring that fire and rescue 
services are able to contribute to both local public health planning, through input to the local 
joint strategic needs assessments as well as to Strategic Transformation Plans is also likely to 
be beneficial.  Collaboration and role expansion into the ‘medical space’ is an exciting proposal 
that will need further evaluation to guide the developments of projects in the future. 
This is a time of change for public services. Fire and rescue services are well positioned to 
future proof their organisations and ensure they continue to make a professional and vital 
contribution to local communities in the 21st century through evolution and expansion of their 
roles with possible closer collaborative working with a variety of healthcare agencies. 
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Background to the evaluation 
 
In 2015 the National Joint Council for Local Authority Fire and Rescue Services (NJC) began 
consideration of how the workforce's skills could best be utilised, exploring new and additional 
types of functions and activities. This included co-responding. Co-responding usually involves 
assistance to people potentially suffering cardiac problems. The ambulance service is 
mobilised at the same time and will attend the call, however response times have so far 
suggested that the fire service is more likely to arrive sooner. 
The position at that time was that responding to incidents of a medical nature, such as co-
responding, was carried out in a number of fire and rescue authorities (FRAs) by employees on 
a voluntary basis rather than as part of the core job. It was also recognised that not all 
ambulance trusts wished to take part. 
Expressions of interest to undertake a trial under the auspices of the NJC in terms of co-
responding were invited from fire and rescue authorities. This included co-responding but also 
work wider than co-responding that would be of value to the community and which, in some 
cases, would build upon collaborative working with other organisations. Some examples of 
wider work being carried out in the NJC trials are: 
 Slips, trips and falls 
 Bariatric assistance 
 Winter warmth assessments 
 Heartstart advice 
 Dementia awareness 
 Alcohol harm and reduction advice 
 Smoking cessation advice 
 Loneliness and isolation advice 
 Safe and Well checks (including Winter Warmth Checks) 
 Holistic safety visits in the home 
 Fitting of risk reduction equipment 
 Providing assistance to the elderly and  frail 
 Gaining entrance on behalf of ambulance services.
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Research question 
The research question identified at the outset of this project was:  what impact, if any, can 
firefighters have on the delivery of emergency medical response (e.g. co-responding) and wider 
community interventions (e.g. dementia awareness) within communities across the UK? 
Aim 
The aim of this project was to examine the effect, if any, that the fire and rescue services are 
having on service provision and delivery within the NJC approved trials in the United Kingdom; 
plus, where feasible within the timescale and if data are available, the effects of any work that is 
being undertaken more widely within other fire and rescue services. 
Definitions 
For the purposes of this project, the following definitions were used, as operated by the NJC. 
Co-responding: this is a scheme whereby appropriately trained and equipped fire and rescue 
service (FRS) staff are mobilised to medical emergencies (as agreed with an NHS ambulance 
service) as part of a joint fire and rescue service and national Health Service response. Co-
responding is similar to first responders except the co-responders in this context are employed by 
a fire and rescue authority which has entered into an agreement with an NHS ambulance service 
to deliver basic life support until the arrival of the ambulance service who can provide advanced 
life support5.  
Wider work: this encompasses all new work broadly described as being of benefit to the 
community. Examples are: working with the elderly in respect of slips, trips and falls; assistance in 
the movement of bariatric patients; appropriate referrals as a consequence of dementia 
awareness training or alcohol addiction awareness training; provision of training to the 
community, for example, in the use of defibrillators and/or fitness training; winter warmth 
assessments; and Safe and Well checks. 
Structure of the report 
This report is structured into three main sections reflecting the core activities within this 
evaluation involving collection and analysis of primary data as well as utilisation of existing data 
and/or published literature in both policy and research. 
1. Examination of results from five research-streams: 
a. Research-stream A: Aggregate survey  
b. Research-stream B: Health economic evaluation  
c. Research-stream C: Case study - interrogation of existing data from one single 
county fire and rescue service and its corresponding ambulance service 
d. Research-stream D: Cardiac arrest download data 
e. Research-stream E: Qualitative telephone interviews 
2. Overall summary and conclusions 
                                                     
5 For the avoidance of doubt first responding is the first person on scene who has been trained on an appropriate and 
approved course. First responders can be members of the public who volunteer for the role which in turn is organised, 
coordinated and managed by an NHS ambulance service. 
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3. Recommendations. 
A summary of relevant published literature including both policy context and a rapid evidence 
review of health related research findings has been included in Appendix 1. 
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Research-stream A: Aggregate survey  
 
This section represents the results of an aggregated survey in which 42 (84%) of 50 fire and rescue 
services took part. Results and discussion have been integrated in order to avoid unnecessary 
repetition. 
Amongst the fire and rescue services who responded to the survey, 32 participated in the NJC trial. 
It is noted that one fire and rescue service did not co-respond to incidents but did conduct some 
wider work. Ten fire and rescue services did not take part in the official NJC trial, however eight of 
them did conduct some co-responding work and all of them participated in wider work.  
Furthermore, one non-trial fire and rescue service did not submit complete data, which is 
reflected in the results.  The data presented below are for all the fire and rescue services that 
responded, whether or not they had taken part in the trial. 
Fire and rescue services started their trials at different times and this is demonstrated in Figure 2 
showing a steady increased participation throughout the duration of the trial. 
 
Figure 2: Number of fire and rescue services participating by date  
Base: all trial fire and rescue services (32) 
 
Number and responses to co-responding incidents 
The number of incidents attended by NJC trial authorities and non-NJC trial authorities was 
recorded during the evaluation period. Table 1 represents 27 out of the 32 trial authorities and 
seven out of 10 non-trial authorities who provided data detailing the total number of incidents, 
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the total number of incidents recorded by those stations/crews available for co-responding, and 
the total number of co-responding incidents. Co-responding incidents added 28% to the volume of 
incidents attended by those stations/crews available for co-responding. 
Table 1: Reported number of incidents by fire and rescue services including the number of co-
responding incidents. 
  
Number of 
incidents 
reported by trial 
FRS 
Number of 
incidents 
reported by non-
trial FRS 
Total 
Total number of incidents recorded in 
the period for the whole FRS (include 
all incidents not just co-
responding/wider work incidents) 
487,797 54,718 542,515 
Total number of incidents recorded 
by those stations/crews available for 
co-responding (include all incidents 
not just co-responding/wider work 
incidents) 
177,991 20,001 197,992 
Total number of co-responding 
incidents attended in the period by 
those stations/crews available for co-
responding 
29,723 13,022 42,745 
 
Table 2 details the number of co-responding incidents attended by firefighters during the 
evaluation period. Only the data from the fire and rescue authorities providing information 
pertaining to all three elements have been included:  28 out of the 32 trial authorities, and five out 
of 10 non-trial authorities. 
Table 2: Number of incidents attended by whole-time, retained duty system and mixed crew 
firefighters  
 Number of incidents 
reported by trial FRS 
Number of incidents 
reported by non-trial 
FRS 
Total 
Number of co-responding incidents 
attended by whole-time firefighters  
12,311 337 12,648 
Number of co-responding incidents 
attended by retained duty system 
firefighters 
12,563 12,570 25,133 
Number of co-responding incidents 
attended by mixed crews 
480 220 700 
Total 25,354 13,127 38,481 
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Overall, 65% of the co-responding incidents were attended by retained duty system firefighters. 
Whole-time firefighters and mixed crews accounted for 32% and 2% respectively. For trial 
authorities, the number of co-responding incidents were mainly attended by retained duty system 
firefighters and whole-time firefighters. However, 96% of incidents by non-trial authorities were 
attended by retained duty system firefighters. 
Thirty-three per cent of the co-responding incidents were attended by whole-time firefighters, 
65% were attended by retained duty system firefighters and 2% by mixed crews during the 
evaluation period. 
For the first on scene data, analysis only includes complete reported cases in order to avoid 
distortion of results. Overall, the fire and rescue service were first on scene most of the time (62%) 
in contrast with the ambulance service (23%) (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: Arrival on scene: fire and rescue services and ambulance services  
Base: fire and rescue services which provided complete responses (29) 
 
However, as reported in the rapid evidence assessment (Lerner et al, 2009), being first on scene 
does not necessarily correlate with appropriate and effective interventions being delivered more 
quickly.  It  should be noted that the data from the defibrillator downloads (n=17), albeit a small 
number, indicates that appropriately trained firefighters are able to deliver effective interventions 
in terms of chest compressions and defibrillation when arriving first on scene at cardiac arrests 
(page 47).  
 
Types of co-responding incidents 
The types of co-responding incidents/activities among the fire and rescue service responded to as 
part of NJC trial are shown in Figure 4.  
FRS were first on 
scene, 62%
Ambulance 
service first on 
scene, 23%
Don't know, 15%
% FIRST ON THE SCENE
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The reported categories are a subset of incidents taken from ‘Incident Recording System’ and for 
future research, consideration should be given to modifying this data collection tool to improve 
the nature of the collected information surrounding the specific triage categories. 
 
 
Figure 4: Type of co-responding incidents among the fire and rescue services participating in the 
NJC trial  
Base: all responding fire and rescue services (32) 
 
All except one (97%) fire and rescue service participating in the NJC trial did co-respond to chest 
pain, heart condition and cardiac arrest incidents. The majority of the trial fire and rescue service 
authorities participating responded to breathing, impairment and respiratory arrest incidents 
(72%), unconscious or fitting casualties (69%) and collapse incidents (53%). 
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Eight of the ten non-trial fire and rescue service authorities, and seven out of the 32 trial fire and 
rescue service authorities did co-respond outside of the NJC trial. The types of co-responding 
incidents/activities undertaken outside of the NJC trial are shown in Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5: Types of co-responding incidents attended by fire and rescue services outside of the NJC 
trial 
Base: all responding fire and rescue services outside the trial (15) 
 
The two most common types of the co-responding incidents outside the trial are chest pain/heart 
condition/cardiac arrest and breathing difficulties / impairment / respiratory arrest for 80 % of the 
responding fire and rescue services. 
Based on the feedback from the interim report, efforts were made by the fire and rescue service 
to provide more details about the incidents; however less than half were able to provide the 
specific triage categories used by the ambulance service. The numbers of co-responding incidents 
during the evaluation period for different categories of cause of death/nature of injury is 
presented in Table 3.  
Table 3: Cause of death or nature of injury 
Cause of death or nature of injury Number of co-
responding incidents 
Number of fire and 
rescue services 
involved 
Chest pain/heart condition/cardiac arrest 10,360 35 
Not known 9,461 24 
Breathing difficulties / impairment / respiratory arrest 4,631 34 
Unconscious, fitting or unresponsive 3,159 35 
No action required 2,761 29 
Other medical condition such as: stroke, choking … 2,241 33 
Collapse 921 32 
Shock/anaphylactic shock 192 33 
 
80%
80%
73%
73%
73%
67%
60%
20%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
Chest pain/heart condition/cardiac arrest
Breathing difficulties / impairment / respiratory arrest
Shock / anaphylactic shock
Unconscious, fitting or unresponsive
Trauma
Collapse
Other medical condition such as: stroke, fainting, …
Other emergencies
22 
 
 
The main category of co-responding incidents (31%) was related to chest pain/heart 
condition/cardiac arrest. For 43% of those incidents, the triage was expanded into two categories 
where 93% corresponded specifically to ‘Cardiac arrest’ (n=4180) and 7% to ‘Chest pain’ (n=314). 
The initial triage categories determined by the ambulance service were often not passed on or 
recorded in that format by the fire and rescue service, and so the available data mixes the 
‘perceived’ nature of the emergency, for example ‘chest pain or cardiac arrest,’ with less well 
defined conditions and also with some assessment as to the actions required.  Future research will 
need to explore the triage categories more comprehensively and, where possible, will also need to 
follow up patient outcomes, while considering the ‘rules of engagement,’ i.e.’ the detailed 
criterion adopted for fire medical responding/co-responding in the difference schemes.  It should 
be noted that no triage system can ever be 100% reliable, particularly at an early stage in the 
information gathering process, and as a result some level of ‘over triage’ to patients whose initial 
symptoms do not translate to a medical emergency will always be inevitable.  There needs to be 
common understanding of what respondents meant by ‘no action required’ as it may simply be 
that there was no requirement for any action due to over triage; or possibly there was a very short 
period of time between the fire service arriving on scene and the ambulance service arriving and 
therefore the fire service did not need to take any action.  Additional data would be required to 
investigate this further. 
Wider work incidents 
Thirteen out of 32 of the trial fire and rescue services were involved in wider work activities.  Table 
4 shows the types of wider work activities (that is, those over and above normal fire and rescue 
activities, but excluding co-responding) undertaken by fire and rescue services. 
Table 4: Types of wider work activities undertaken by fire and rescue services participating in the 
trial  
Wider work activities Number of trial 
FRS authorities 
Slips, trips and falls 7 
Smoking cessation advice  5 
Safe and Well Checks  5 
Fitting of risk reduction equipment 5 
Dementia Awareness 4 
Alcohol harm and reduction advice 4 
Winter warmth assessments 3 
Heartstart advice 3 
Loneliness and isolation advice  3 
Holistic safety visits in the home  3 
Providing assistance to the elderly and frail  3 
Gaining entry on behalf of ambulance services  3 
Bariatric assistance 2 
Base: all fire and rescue services participating in the trial and performing wider work activities 
(13) 
23 
 
 
It is noted that 31 fire and rescue services carried out wider work activities outside the NJC trial: 
nine of the non-trial authorities, and 22 of the trial authorities. 
Table 5 details the types of wider work activities undertaken by fire and rescue services 
responding outside the NJC trial. 
Table 5: Types of wider work activities undertaken by the fire and rescue services responding 
outside the NJC trial 
Wider work activities 
Number of 
trial FRS 
authorities 
Number of 
non-trial FRS 
authorities 
Total 
Bariatric assistance 19 6 25 
Fitting of risk reduction equipment 15 6 21 
Holistic safety visits in the home  14 4 18 
Gaining entry on behalf of ambulance services  14 4 18 
Safe and Well Checks  11 6 17 
Dementia Awareness 9 4 13 
Slips, trips and falls 7 3 10 
Heartstart advice 6 4 10 
Providing assistance to the elderly and frail  8 2 10 
Winter warmth assessments 8 1 9 
Alcohol harm and reduction advice 9 0 9 
Smoking cessation advice  9 0 9 
Loneliness and isolation advice  5 1 6 
 
In comparison with the wider work activities undertaken as part of the NJC trial, there was a 
notably larger number of fire and rescue services undertaking wider work activities outside the 
trial (although some of those  services were still operating co-responding within the trial). Table 6 
illustrates the differences in volume of services participating in wider work. 
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Table 6: Number of fire and rescue services undertaking wider work ‘as part of the trial’ versus 
‘outside of the trial’ 
Wider work activities 
Number of fire and 
rescue services 
undertaking wider 
work as part of the 
trial 
Number of fire 
and rescue 
services 
undertaking 
wider work 
outside the trial 
Bariatric assistance 2 19 
Gaining entry on behalf of ambulance services  3 14 
Holistic safety visits in the home  3 14 
Fitting of risk reduction equipment 5 15 
Safe and Well Checks  5 11 
Alcohol harm and reduction advice 4 9 
Dementia Awareness 4 9 
Providing assistance to the elderly and frail  3 8 
Winter warmth assessments 3 8 
Smoking cessation advice  5 9 
Heartstart advice 3 6 
Loneliness and isolation advice  3 5 
Slips, trips and falls 7 7 
 
Notably bariatric assistance is the activity which varies the most, with 17 fewer authorities 
undertaking this wider work activity as part of the trial. 
During the evaluation period, a total of 218,679 wider work incidents were covered by the fire and 
rescue services (Table 7). It was noted that over half (53%) of the wider work involved safety visits 
at home.  This is in line with published research studies discussed in the rapid evidence 
assessment (Appendix 1), which identified an emphasis on falls prevention, safety assessment in 
homes for fire hazards and other health conditions including such diverse chronic conditions such 
as dementia (Laybourne, Martin, Whiting, & Lowton, 2011).  
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Table 7: Number of wider work activities undertaken by the fire and rescue services during the 
evaluation period 
Wider work activities Number of 
reported incidents 
Holistic safety visits in the home 114,872 
Safe and Well Checks  64,268 
Home safety assessments 29,229 
Gaining entry on behalf of the ambulance service 4,195 
Slips, trips and falls 2,572 
Heartstart advice  1,676 
Other: assist other agencies 1,174 
 Bariatric assistance 368 
Winter warmth assessments  220 
Fitting of risk reduction equipment  75 
Dementia Awareness  20 
Smoking cessation advice 8 
Loneliness and isolation advice  2 
 Alcohol harm and reduction advice 0 
 Providing assistance to the elderly and frail  0 
Total 218,679 
 
The second most frequently undertaken type of wider work activity was safe and well checks 
including winter warmth checks (29%). 
Implications of wider role of fire and rescue services 
Only thirteen out of 32 trial fire and rescue services were involved in wider work activities.  And of 
these, seven (22%) took part in activities to prevent slips, trips and falls. Evidence suggests that hip 
fractures carry a substantial cost both personally and economically.  As patients’ age, decreasing 
bone mass, functional decline and drug interactions raise the potential for accidental slips, trips 
and falls (Carpintero et al., 2014).  Ninety per cent of hip fractures occur in people over the age of 
65: this represents 25% of all geriatric fractures.  Despite improvements in care, subsequent 
mortality and morbidity is still high. 
It is estimated that between 30-60% of community dwelling adults fall each year (Morrison, 
Chassin, & Siu, 1998).  Moreover 90% of hip fractures occur from a simple fall from standing 
height.  Poor lighting and other issues within the elderly person’s environment compound the 
problem; an issue further exacerbated by low socioeconomic status, smoking, increased alcohol 
intake and dementia (Carpintero et al., 2014). 
Studies suggest post-operative mortality from hip fractures at between 14 and 36% in patients 65 
and older (Panula et al., 2011).   One half of hip fracture patients will never fully regain 
independent living, requiring costly home care and support (NICE, 2011).    
Currently there are approximately 70,000 hip fractures each year in the UK, costing £2 billion each 
year.  The incidence is expected to rise to 101,000 by 2020 (NICE, 2011).  Clearly a multi-
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disciplinary approach to reducing the risk of falls is likely to impact in this area with considerable 
economic and individual benefit; the fire service has an important role to play here. 
Involvement in wider works appears in line with published research studies that have been 
discussed in the literature review which identified an emphasis on falls prevention, safety 
assessment in homes for fire hazards and other health conditions including such diverse chronic 
conditions such as dementia. 
There are clearly wider roles in health and well-being apart from the high acuity calls that the fire 
and rescue services could be further involved in.  It is frequently more difficult in chronic 
conditions to assess efficacy or impact on patient outcome without using some qualitative 
assessments such as quality of life measures.  The diversity of activities demonstrated in Table 7 
leads to the conclusion that fire and rescue services should determine at a local level what roles to 
undertake, based on knowledge of local communities’ health and social care needs. 
Available resources 
The fire and rescue services which were co-responding and who replied to the survey covered 511 
whole-time fire stations, 843 retained duty system fire stations, and 192 mixed crew fire stations.  
However, not all of their stations and staff were actively involved in co-responding activities.  Of 
their fire stations, 105 (21%) whole-time fire stations, 216 (26%) retained duty fire stations and 83 
(43%) mixed fire stations were available for co-responding.  This amounted to 26% of stations 
overall. 
Similarly, not all of their operational appliances were involved: 368 out of 2,061 pumps (18%) and 
two of the 92 aerials were available (2%) for co-responding. Furthermore 50 out of the 569 special 
appliances (9%) and 165 of the 444 other operational appliances (37%) were also available.  This 
equated to 19% of operational appliances being available for co-responding. 
Finally, in terms of numbers of firefighters, 4,220 whole-time firefighters, 2,051 retained 
firefighters, and 250 control firefighters were assigned to co-responding representing 19%, 19% 
and 22% of the workforce respectively (and 19% of the workforce overall).  Limitations in the data 
do not allow any clear comparison between the different models of service delivery adopted by 
whole-time and retained duty systems and this area would benefit from further clarification.  For 
example, some fire and rescue services mobilise firefighters from their stations using their 
standard appliances, while others utilise ‘solo’ officer responders.  Equally, models may differ 
when using retained duty personnel.  Resolving which arrangements are more effective at 
reducing the interval between a unit being tasked and arriving at scene is of significant importance 
in helping to determine the potential contribution to improving patient outcomes; as is 
understanding whether the number of personnel being tasked affects the outcome. 
Figure 6 represents the proportions of the different resources allocated to co-responding in fire 
and rescue services. 
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Figure 6: Allocation of resources in fire and rescue services to support co-responding activities 
Call classification used between the fire service and the ambulance service 
All except one fire and rescue service participating in the NJC trial responded to Red 1 calls (98%); 
18 out of the 32 (56%) responded to Red 2 calls; and one of them responded to other calls during 
the NJC trial period. Outside the NJC trial, 13 out of 15 (87%) fire and rescue services responded to 
Red 1 calls, 11 (73%) responded to Red 2 calls and eight (53%) responded to other calls. 
 
Equipment and personnel costs 
The survey included questions on the costs associated with participating in co-responding, 
including equipment purchases, retained duty payments, overtime costs, and training.  However, 
not all services reported costs, whilst others simply noted that their costs had been covered from 
other sources.  It was not possible to determine whether the services not responding to this 
question had zero costs or simply chose not to respond.  For the services that did report costs, it 
was not possible to determine the quantities of equipment or other items covered by the costs so 
there was no scope to standardize across services.  Given the number of the non-reporting 
services, and the highly variable costs amongst those that did, Table 8 needs to be interpreted 
with caution.   However, as the categories themselves may be informative in understanding the 
potential scope of costs we have included them below: 
 Vehicle-associated cost (e.g. conversion, blue lights, maintenance, stickers, fuel) 
 Vehicles 
 Defibrillators (including pads) 
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 Handling equipment including lifting equipment 
 Medical equipment including pulse oximeter, clinical bags, iGels, first aid kits 
 Clothing (including protective clothing, uniforms) 
 IT equipment 
 Training equipment (including manikins) 
 Communication equipment 
 Other equipment 
 Medical training including co-responder training, trauma course, FPOS course 
 Backfill cost 
 Driver training  
 Radio communication training 
 Trauma Risk Management training and Distress & Crisis management Training 
 Catering 
 Vaccinations 
 DBS checks 
 Medical consumables  
 Cost of mileage and staffing time for all incidents 
 Vehicle Costs 
 Marketing cost 
 Post-traumatic stress critical incident debriefing 
 Travel 
Five fire and rescue services reported that their equipment costs were covered by other sources. 
Nine fire and rescue services did not input any equipment costs. For the remaining 28 fire and 
rescue services Table 8 illustrates estimated costs incurred during the evaluation period.   
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Table 8: Estimated summary of costs and expenses incurred during the trial period 
Cost Amount Number of FRS 
Vehicle-associated cost (e.g. conversion, blue lights, 
maintenance, stickers, fuel) 
£585,772 11 
Vehicles £423,000 4 
Defibrillators (including pads) £230,701 9 
Handling equipment including lifting equipment £145,145 3 
Medical equipment including pulse oximeter, clinical bags, 
iGels, first aid kits 
£64,984 19 
Clothing (including protective clothing, uniforms) £64,569 21 
IT equipment £48,038 6 
Training equipment (including manikins) £44,570 9 
Communication equipment £19,595 4 
Other equipment £2,649 6 
Total £1,629,023   
 
Average cost of attending incidents 
Seventeen per cent of the fire and rescue services doing co-responding reported an average cost 
across all incident types (co-responding and usual fire and rescue incidents). For all incident types, 
the cost of all vehicles per co-responding incident including the employee costs was on average 
£181. The cost of the pumps per co-responding incident including the employee costs was on 
average £324. The cost of other vehicles per co-responding incident including the employee costs 
was on average £142. 
Twenty-four per cent of the co-responding fire and rescue services reported an average 
specifically for co-responding incidents. The cost of all vehicles per co-responding incident 
including the employee costs was on average £169 and £100 excluding the employee costs. The 
cost of the pumps per co-responding incident including the employee costs was on average £264 
and £40 excluding the employee costs. The cost of other vehicles per co-responding incident 
including the employee costs was on average £52. 
Summary conclusion 
The data from the aggregate survey have provided relevant stand-alone information about work 
and activities both within and outside the NJC trial, as well as informing development of the health 
economic analysis presented in the following section.  
During the evaluation period firefighters co-responded to over 10,000 chest pain/heart 
condition/cardiac arrest incidents over this period representing 31% of all the co-responding 
incidents.  
Overall, the fire and rescue services manage to get to 62% of all calls before the ambulance 
services which is notable in relation to the role of fire and rescue services in supporting ambulance 
services to manage time-critical high acuity calls. 
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Research-stream B: Health Economic 
Evaluation 
 
The objective of the economic evaluation was to test whether fire and rescue service co-
responding was associated with faster arrival at the scene for patients in cardiac arrest relative to 
ambulance response alone.  Faster arrival on scene with appropriate action has been shown to 
improve the chance of patient survival and a normal life expectancy. 
Data preparation 
The analysis was based on two data sets: NJC incident data for services participating in co-
responding (N=33,959, covering 25 fire and rescue services), and a paired sample of ambulance 
and fire and rescue service co-responding records from one county over the period October 2015 
through October 2016 (N=1,293).   
As detailed in Table 9 below there were a substantial number of missing records in the NJC 
dataset, most notably in the times the fire and rescue service and the ambulance arrived on-
scene.   
 
Table 9: Key fields in the NJC dataset 
Field # valid # invalid/missing % invalid/missing 
Date/time of call 33,926 33 < 0.1% 
Time at scene 22,165 11,794 34.7% 
Incident stop time 26,509 7,450 21.9% 
Incident closed time 27,669 6,290 18.5% 
Time ambulance at scene 1,500 32,459 95.6% 
Incident date ≥ 01/01/2015 33,089 35 < 0.1% 
Call time < on-scene time 33,095 29 < 0.1% 
Note that valid and invalid records in this table are calculated for the full dataset (N=33,959), before any 
exclusions are applied.   
 
After excluding records that were missing the date/time of call, had an incident date prior to 2015, 
or an on-scene time prior to the call time (negative response time), we were left with 21,878 
records covering 15 fire and rescue services.  It was also discovered that one fire and rescue 
service’s data system was incorrectly recording response times and so we had to exclude all their 
records.  This reduced the number of records to 12,924 records and 14 services.  We also found 
some extreme outliers in response times that were skewing the results so we excluded records 
that had a response time which was greater the 99.9th percentile of all response times (≥ 817.94 
minutes, 13.6 hours).  This left 12,911 records covering 14 fire and rescue services. 
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The time the ambulance arrived on scene was missing in 96% of NJC incident records.  Where it 
was reported, the ambulance response times ranged from a minimum of -26 minutes to a 
maximum of 2,643 hours (110 days).  Because of very extreme response times like this, the 
average ambulance response time was unrealistically large: 4,996 minutes or 83 hours.  Ten per 
cent of the ambulance response times were greater 417 minutes (7 hours) and five per cent were 
greater than 134,446 minutes (93 days).  Since none of these extreme times seemed realistic we 
made the decision to only compare ambulance response times of 60 minutes or less (N=1,371).  
Among these records, the average ambulance response time was 16.53 minutes.     
The paired single county data was similar to the NJC incident dataset and included information on 
the date/time of call, the time the first responder arrived on-scene and the time the ambulance 
service arrived on-scene.  The first service to arrive is not specified, but ambulance times greater 
than the first on-scene time indicate that the fire and rescue service arrived first.  When the 
ambulance time is equal to the first service on-scene, it indicates that the ambulance arrived 
first.  The absence of individual arrival times for the ambulance and the fire and rescue service 
does not limit the analysis, as the objective of the analysis was to test the value of faster fire and 
rescue service arrival on-scene; when the ambulance arrives on-scene first there was, by 
definition, no benefit in fire and rescue service co-responding. 
The key fields in the paired single county co-responding dataset are detailed in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Key fields in the paired single county co-responding dataset 
Field # valid # invalid/missing % invalid/missing 
Date/time of call 1,293 0 0 
Time first responder at scene 1,293 0 0 
Time ambulance at scene 1,288 5 0.3% 
Call time ≤ on-scene time 1,293 0 0 
 
The distribution of response times was tighter than observed in the NJC incident data.  The first 
service on scene arrived within 8.95 minutes in half of all incidents and the mean response time 
was 9.88 minutes.  Including cases where ambulance was first on scene, they arrived within 15.88 
minutes in half of all incidents and the mean time was 19.40 minutes.  As there were no extreme 
outliers in the data it was decided to include all records in the analysis. 
Response times by service 
The first step in the analysis was to test whether fire and rescue service co-responding was 
associated with faster times to scene than ambulance alone.  This analysis was limited to ‘time 
critical’ calls, defined in the NJC incident dataset as calls with an NJC or IRS category code with 
“cardiac arrest” or “respiratory arrest”, and in the paired single county dataset as “Red 1” calls.  By 
definition, there is little or no survival advantage associated with co-responding to non-critical 
calls.   
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In absolute terms, the fire and rescue service was first on-scene in 93% of time-critical incidents 
(life threatening) in the NJC incident data.  In the paired single county data, the fire and rescue 
service was first on-scene in all Red-1 incidents.  The ambulance service was on-scene within 1 
minute of the first on-scene in 17% of incidents.  The distribution of time-critical response times 
from the NJC incident and the paired single county datasets are shown in Figure 7.  The left-hand 
panel shows the distribution of fire and rescue service and ambulance response times up to 60 
minutes from the NJC dataset.  The average fire and rescue service response time was 8.67 
minutes and the average ambulance response time (conditional on ≤ 60 minutes) was 17.54 
minutes, a difference of 8.86 minutes.   
The right-hand panel shows the distribution of response times of the first service on-scene 
(including the ambulance service) and the ambulance-only response times for Red 1 calls from the 
paired single county dataset.  The average response times were 9.01 and 13.66 minutes, 
respectively, a difference of 4.65 minutes. 
 
 
Figure 7: Response times to ‘time critical’ incidents, by service and data source 
 
The scatterplots in Figure 8 show paired fire and rescue service and ambulance response times.  
Read across the bottom axis to see the fire and rescue service response time and then vertically to 
see the distribution of ambulance response times for that particular fire and rescue service time.  
There is no clear relationship between fire and rescue service and ambulance response times, but 
most ambulance response times lie above the diagonal line, indicating that ambulance response 
times were usually greater than fire and rescue service response times.   
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Figure 8: Paired response times to ‘time critical’ incidents, by data source 
 
We further explored the NJC incident data by linking fire and rescue service response times from 
the NJC incident data with the proportion of retained duty stations from the aggregate survey.  It 
was our expectation that services with a higher proportion of retained duty stations would have 
longer response times, but Figure 9 below shows little association between the proportion of 
whole-time stations and median response times.  Note that not all services in the NJC incident 
data were represented in the aggregate survey, so not all services are presented in the figure. 
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Figure 9: Fire and rescue service median response times by service and proportion of whole-time 
stations 
 
Regression analysis found that the median fire and rescue service response time decreased by 8.4 
seconds for every 10 per cent increase in the proportion of whole-time stations within a service.  
Interpreting this result is complicated by the fact that services with a lower proportion of whole-
time stations are also likely to be more rural, with correspondingly greater distances between 
stations and the location of the incident.  Therefore, it is not clear whether differences in response 
times are more related to duty systems or the rurality of the service.  Also note that these are fire 
and rescue service response times only, as paired ambulance response times were not available 
for most incidents in the NJC data.  It is possible that that we would see the difference in fire and 
rescue service and ambulance service response times more closely linked to the proportion of 
whole-time stations, as the impact of greater distances in more rural services would apply equally 
to both services, but this analysis was not possible with the data available. 
Survival gains and societal value from co-responding 
As mentioned in the introduction, there is a potential relationship between patient outcome and 
the speed of response in to cardiac arrest patients.  The relationship between response time and 
predicted survival immediately following cardiac arrest is shown in Figure 10.  It illustrates the 
potential benefit of even relatively small reductions in response time due to co-responding. 
 
35 
 
 
 
 
The predicted probability of survival for ‘critical’ calls was calculated for each service on the basis 
of the incident-level response times from the NJC incident and paired single county datasets.  The 
gain in the probability of survival was calculated as the difference between the probability of 
survival given fire and rescue service response time and the probability given the ambulance 
response time.  For example, if the fire and rescue service arrived in 5 minutes (a 12% probability 
of survival from Figure 10) and the ambulance arrived in 7 minutes (a 7.5% probability of survival 
from Figure 10), the net gain in the probability of survival was the difference between 12% and 
7.5%, or 4.5%.  When the ambulance arrived first, the direct survival advantage due to fire and 
rescue service co-responding was zero.  The net survival advantage for all combinations of fire and 
rescue service and ambulance response times is shown in Appendix 2, and the mean survival 
advantages across all records by data source are shown in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Co-responding survival advantage by data source 
Dataset Critical incidents (%) Mean survival advantage (95% confidence interval) 
NJC 2,684/12,911 (20.8%) +5.30% (4.90%, 5.70%) 
Single county 266/1,293 (20.6%) +2.74% (2.37%, 3.18%) 
 
These expected survival gains were used to weight age-specific life expectancies derived from UK 
life tables (Office for National Statistics, 2015) to estimate the life years gained as a result of co-
responding.  Since these life years will not be lived in perfect health, they were further weighted 
by the expected health-related quality-of-life (HRQoL) of cardiac arrest survivors (Nichol at al., 
1999) to estimate quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) gained by co-responding.  To illustrate, a 65 
year-old female has a remaining life expectancy of 20.9 years.  Improving her likelihood of survival 
by 5.3% translates into an expected gain of 20.9 x 5.3% = 1.11 life years.  These years would have a 
Figure 10: Predicted survival immediately following cardiac arrest (De Maio et al., 2003) 
36 
 
 
quality of 78% of perfect health, so the quality-adjusted life years would be 1.11 x 0.78 = 0.87 
QALYs.   
Note that gains in survival were calculated on the basis of expected, not actual outcomes.  If the 
fire and rescue service arrived on-scene sooner than the ambulance, this was counted as a gain in 
expected survival, regardless of whether or not the specific patient survived.  The relevant measure 
in this context is whether co-responding improved the population-level likelihood of survival, not 
the outcome of specific patients.   
The average age of patients in the incident data was 62 and, based on UK life tables, their 
estimated average remaining life expectancy was 22 years.  After weighting by the co-responding 
survival advantage from Table 3, the average life years gained with co-responding was 1.35 and 
the average QALYs gained was 1.05.  Based on a societal willingness-to-pay of ₤20,000 per QALY, 
as recommended by NICE (Rawlins and Culyer, 2004), the average fire and rescue service co-
response to time-critical incidents generated a gross societal value of ₤21,047 per incident. 
These figures are less favourable when considering the paired single county data, reflecting the 
smaller difference in response times and so the lower survival advantage associated with co-
responding.  Patient age was not reported in this dataset but, assuming the same age   distribution 
as the NJC incident data, led to an average remaining life expectancy of 26 years.  After weighting 
by co-responding survival advantage, the average life years gained through co-responding was 
0.73 and the average QALYs gained was 0.56.  At ₤20,000 per QALY gained, this implies a gross 
societal value of ₤11,352 per Red 1 incident. 
It is important to note that, in both the datasets considered here, the proportion of critical 
incidents was only 21% of all co-responding incidents.  This means that 4 out of every 5 of co-
responding events generated no survival advantage.  When this proportion is factored into the 
calculation, societal value falls to £4,420 based on the NJC incident data and £2,384 based on the 
paired single county data.   
Costs of co-responding 
The analysis above suggests that co-responding is associated with benefits in the form of gains in 
survival and QALYs, with a corresponding societal value, but it is also important to consider the 
costs of co-responding.  These costs include training and additional human resource costs, 
specialised medical equipment, consumables, and vehicle operating expenses.   
The NJC aggregate survey returns did not provide a specific cost per incident, so it was necessary 
to estimate costs on the basis of the information provided in this survey, other information 
available online, and some conservative assumptions.  The estimates are based on an average 
crew of 3.8, derived from the NJC data.  Retained duty firefighters are paid a £3.90 disturbance fee 
and then the same hourly wage as whole-time firefighters.  Whole-time firefighters are paid for 
the entire time they are on duty, regardless of whether they responded to an event, and therefore 
do not represent an additional expense due to co-responding.  Retained duty firefighters, though, 
are paid only if they respond to an incident, and then in hourly ‘blocks’: they receive a full hour’s 
pay for incidents between 1-60 minutes, another full hour’s pay for incidents between 61-120 
minutes, and so on.  Based on the NJC incident data the average co-responding incident was 47 
minutes.  This was rounded up to a full hour’s pay for each retained duty firefighter, assumed to 
be £13.53.  As a sensitivity analysis, we tested the impact of co-responding incidents taking 
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between 61 and 120 minutes, doubling the cost per incident of a retained duty firefighter to 
£27.06.   
On the basis of these estimates and assumptions, the average cost per co-responding incident was 
estimated to be £284 with whole-time firefighters and £350 with retained duty firefighters.  The 
inputs to this calculation are detailed in Appendix 2. Note, though, that these cost calculations are 
relatively simplistic.  A more detailed accounting of the costs associated with co-responding would 
allow for better informed decision-making. 
Net benefits and return on investment  
Deducting the costs of co-responding from the monetised benefits of all co-responding incidents 
(critical and non-critical) in the two datasets results a conservative net benefit of between £1,985 
and £4,091 per incident, or a return on investment of between £5.67 and £14.40 per £1 invested.  
The cost per QALY gained through co-responding is between £1,302 and £3,041; well within NICE's 
maximum willingness-to-pay threshold of £20,000 per QALY gained.  Note that these are 
conservative estimates based on all co-responding incidents; net benefit and return on investment 
are more favourable when only considering time-critical events.  The costs and benefits for time-
critical and all co-responding incidents are summarised in Table 12, by data source and by whole-
time (WT) and retained duty (RD) responders: 
 
Table 12: Co-responding costs and benefits, by data source and responder status 
 NJC data Single-county data 
 Time-critical All incidents Time-critical All incidents 
QALYs gained per co-responding incident 1.05 0.22 0.56 0.12 
Value per co-responding incident £21,047 £4,375 £11,352 £2,335 
Cost per co-responding incident (WT) £284 £284 £284 £284 
Cost per co-responding incident (RD) £350 £350 £350 £350 
Net monetary benefit (WT) £20,763 £4,091 £11,068 £2,051 
Net monetary benefit (RD) £20,697 £4,025 £11,002 £1,985 
Monetary return per £1 investment (WT) £73.08 £14.40 £38.96 £7.22 
Monetary return per £1 investment (RD) £59.08 £11.49 £31.40 £5.67 
Cost per QALY gained (WT) £271 £1,302 £507 £2,466 
Cost per QALY gained (RD) £334 £1,605 £626 £3,041 
QALYs=Quality-adjusted life years; WT = Whole-time; RD=Retained duty 
 
A limitation to this analysis is that we assumed the cost of responding to non-critical events would 
be the same as responding to time-critical events.  Given the uncertainty around the precise costs 
of co-responding, we tested a scenario where we doubled our cost estimates.  Even under this less 
favourable scenario, all co-responding was still associated with positive net benefits of between 
£1,635 and £3,807 per incident, and a societal return on investment of between £2.33 and £6.70 
per £1 invested.  The cost per QALY gained was between £2,603 and £6,082, still well within the 
NICE £20,000 threshold. 
It is difficult to estimate the total budget impact of co-responding as we did not have 
comprehensive data covering the entire UK.  An estimate, though, may be drawn from the average 
number of co-responding incidents per station in the NJC incident data, including urban and rural 
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services. Individual stations responded to an average of  (minimum 1 incident; maximum 
1,805).  At an estimated cost of between £284 and £350 per incident for whole-time or retained 
duty stations, respectively, this suggests the average annual cost of co-responding would be 
between £41,000 and £51,000 per station.  Based on responses to the aggregate survey, each fire 
and rescue service had an average of 33 percent strictly whole-time stations.  Using this 
proportion gives a weighted average cost of £47,560 per station.  For the 257 unique stations in 
the NJC incident data, this suggests a total annual cost of £12.2 million.  If this average cost per 
station is applied for example to all 704 stations in England, the total annual cost would be in the 
range of £33.5 million.  It is important to highlight, though, that this estimate implicitly assumes 
that the stations that did not participate in the co-responding trial would respond to the same 
number of incidents, on average, as those stations that did participate.  As above, it also assumes 
that the cost of non-critical events is the same as responding to a critical event. 
Limitations 
There were a number of limitations in the analysis.  Most notably, there was a large number of 
missing values in the incident data provided by fire and rescue services, particularly around fire 
and rescue service time-at-scene and ambulance arrival times.  After data cleaning, only 14 of the 
25 fire and rescue services that participated in the trial were included in the analysis.  This, and the 
narrow geographic focus of the paired single county data, means that the results reported here 
may not be generalisable across all services and jurisdictions.  Other jurisdictions may see larger or 
smaller (or possibly even negative) advantages in fire and rescue service response times, with 
corresponding impacts on the benefit of co-responding.  In particular, paired fire and rescue 
service/ambulance response times -- in both the NJC incident and the single county datasets – 
were only available for urban services.  This means that the benefit of co-responding for rural 
areas cannot necessarily be assumed to be the same.  Likewise, we were unable to estimate 
differential fire and rescue service response times for whole-time and retained duty systems.  It 
seems plausible that whole-time responders, based at a station, will usually have faster response 
times than retained duty systems for a given level or rurality.  Different models of co-responding – 
particularly where retained duty system responders have a vehicle at their home or workplace – 
may affect response times.   
Finally, the analysis assumes that the fire and rescue service actions upon arrival at the scene of an 
incident will be identical to the ambulance service in terms of appropriateness and effectiveness.  
There is no direct data available to test this assumption as that is outside the scope of this 
evaluation.  Further research is necessary to establish whether fire and rescue service co-
responding is indeed equally effective in terms of health outcomes, not just response times. 
Summary conclusion 
On the basis of the NJC and single-county datasets, fire and rescue service co-responding appears 
to be associated with faster response times to scene and, assuming an immediate implementation 
of appropriate actions, corresponding gains in survival probability and life expectancy.  When 
considered in the context of the costs, co-responding appears to be associated with very 
favourable value for money compared to common standards of value for money.  The net benefit, 
or efficiency, of co-responding is maximised when responding to time-critical incidents such as 
cardiac arrest.  Responding to less time-critical incidents is associated with smaller net benefits. 
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Research-stream C: Case study - 
interrogation of existing data from a single 
county fire and rescue service and the 
corresponding ambulance service 
 
This section of the report looks in more detail at the paired single county data referred to in 
Research-stream B.  It was compiled utilising data from a single county fire and rescue service and 
its corresponding ambulance service. Data comprised 1293 calls attended by both the fire and 
rescue service and the ambulance service (co-response); and the period covered by this data ran 
from the 21 October 2015 until the 21 October 2016.  Figure 11 shows the calls broken down into 
Red 1 (immediately life-threatening) and Red 2 (serious but not the most life threatening) by 
percentage. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Red 1 and Red 2 calls by percentage between 21 October 2015 and 21 October 2016 
 
The ambulance service national response time target for Red 1 and Red 2 calls is that 75% should 
be reached in eight minutes or less (DOH, 2015).  There has however been a steady decline 
nationally in performance for several years (Nuffield Trust, 2016) as illustrated in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12: The proportion of Category A (Red 1 and 2) calls attended within 8 minutes over time 
 
The single county fire and rescue service attended 100 calls per month, when averaged across the 
study period (Figure 13). 
 
 
Figure 13:  Total fire and rescue service co-responding incidents by month 
 
The calls were identified against 36 categories, as shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14: Nature of co-responding call and frequency 
 
The bulk of this clinical problem data falls into six categories;  
 Fitting - 9% 
 Cardiac/Respiratory Arrest - 9% 
 Unconscious - 13% 
 Breathing/ENT Problems - 13%  
 NHS 111 - 18% 
 Chest Pain/Cardiac Problem - 23% 
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Broadening the Role 
Broadening the role of the fire and rescue services to attend emergency operations centre 
directed calls has three considerations:  
1) Does co-responding improve response times and, if so, are these improvements both 
statistically significant and clinically relevant? 
2) Does co-responding lead to improvements in patient care in terms of outcomes (reduction 
in mortality and morbidity)? 
3) Does co-responding lead to unintended consequences such as delays to definitive 
secondary care, or the withholding of additional resources as a response has already been 
achieved.    
Since the introduction of Call Connect in 2006, it was, has been, and still is widely accepted that 
ambulance service call volume rises between 5-8% per year (DOH, 2005; HSCIC, 2014).     
It would be entirely reasonable to expect that the availability of additional resources in the form of 
fire and rescue service vehicles and personnel would go some way to arresting the decline in 
response times. Understandably, an additional question lies in the sustainability of this as a long 
term solution.  
The unintended consequences of this arrangement could see the fire and rescue services ending 
up with more than they initially bargained for, acting as a proxy ambulance service in the absence 
of supporting resources.  Considerable evidence exists for target gaming in both the ambulance 
services and wider National Health Service (NHS).  Gaming typically occurs when incentives are 
attached to targets in terms of success or failure and subsequent monetary funding or fines 
(Bevan & Hood, 2006; Heath and Radcliffe 2007). 
One cannot overlook the potential by ambulances services to utilise this fire and rescue service 
response as a “clock stopper” thereby delaying subsequent supporting responses from the 
ambulance service. 
Most of the current NHS drivers such as the Keogh Review (Keogh, 2013)  are moving towards 
utilising Paramedics as part of a multi-disciplinary workforce, delivering care in the home.  It is 
difficult, although not impossible, to see the fire and rescue services able to contribute in this 
area. 
The provision of care for conditions such as myocardial infarction, stroke and trauma means they 
are now treated primarily in specialist secondary centres necessitating higher levels of skill in 
managing these patients in the prehospital setting (Ball, 2005; NCEPOD, 2007; Price, 2006). 
The fire and rescue services would need to establish, in conjunction with ambulance services, a 
robust scope of practice with clear clinical governance in order to protect both patients and staff.  
Cardiac Arrest 
Analysing the data, it was noted that 9% of the 1,293 calls were ‘Cardiac/respiratory arrest’.  This 
is an area where fire and rescue service staff may have considerable utility.  Since the OPALS study 
demonstrated that time to defibrillation is key in optimising survival following out of hospital 
cardiac arrest (OHCA) it is now widely accepted that a well-trained, motivated and equipped first 
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responder system is associated with improved survival in international best in class systems (De 
Maio, Stiell, Wells, & Spaite, 2003).  Moreover the eight minute response time target was, and is, 
deemed to be a suboptimal strategy.  The early provision of defibrillation has demonstrated 
efficacy, particularly in the electrical phase, which last approximately four minutes from point of 
circulatory arrest (Weisfeldt, 2004).  Several studies have shown that defibrillation when 
performed by appropriately trained non-emergency medical service personnel improves survival, 
especially if aligned to high quality CPR (Caffrey, 2002; Hallstrom et al., 2004; Mosesso et al., 2002; 
Nichol et al., 2009; Valenzuela et al., 2000).  
The OPALS study proposes that survival from OHCA declines by 23% each minute defibrillation is 
delayed; moreover a plateau was reached at five minutes beyond which the effectiveness of 
defibrillation declined markedly (De Maio et al., 2003).  Reviewing the single county’s paired 
ambulance/fire service data and performing sub analysis of the 100 calls indicated as 
‘Cardiac/respiratory arrest’ showed a statistically significant improvement in response time 
performance for the single county fire and rescue service when compared with their 
corresponding ambulance service responses (Figure 15); this can be seen when analysing the 
median response time for both groups.  If correct, this response time advantage could be 
exploited to initiate high quality CPR and early defibrillation in shockable rhythms; data from 
international studies would suggest this confers a survival advantage in populations supported by 
this infrastructure (Hallstrom et al., 2004; Herlitz et al., 2003).    
 
 
Figure 15: Fire and rescue service compared to ambulance service response times (n= 100) 
 
The median response time for the single county fire and rescue service responding to cardiac 
arrest was 7 minutes 7 seconds; the median response time for their corresponding ambulance 
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service for the same calls was 10 minutes 46 seconds (a statistically significant difference of 2 
minutes 23 seconds). 
The single county fire and rescue service achieved an 8 minute response to cardiac arrest in 66% 
of the 100 cases included in the study. The ambulance service achieved an 8 minute response time 
in 24% of the 100 cases included in the study. 
The ambulance service national response time targets for this call would be 75%. Best in class 
(international) would achieve an 8 minute response in 90% of cases. 
In 2001 Pell, Sirel, Marsden, Ford, and Cobbe (2001) used Scottish Ambulance Service data for 
responses to cardiac arrest to propose an extended role for the fire and rescue service, whose 
response time targets to fires were 90% in 5 minutes; this would have brought defibrillation times 
to within the survival plateau, increasing survival from 8% to 11%. 
Summary conclusion 
A greater integration of fire and rescue services and ambulance services’ resources co-responding 
as little as a decade ago would unlikely have found many caveats to its implementation.  Large 
increases in prehospital research has driven significant clinical change in this arena.   
The case for co-responding in cases of cardiopulmonary arrest are well founded on international 
literature; this would present the most compelling argument for broadening the role of the fire 
and rescue service in relation to higher acuity work.   
The case for targeted responding to cardiac / respiratory arrests can be broadly made on the basis 
of the response time survival curve, where time to defibrillation is a key component of successful 
resuscitation.  
In recent years, standards of care have changed markedly around the use of oxygen and other 
pharmacological interventions, whilst new direct admission pathways for myocardial infarction, 
stroke, arrhythmias and trauma necessitate greater complexity in assessment; this would require 
substantial and sustained investment in training and education for any staff involved in delivery of 
this care to these patients. 
Clinically at this stage it is difficult to envisage the fire and rescue services as more than co- 
responders with a tightly defined boundary of interventions, unless there is considerable upskilling 
in terms of clinical examination, assessment and treatment provision. 
Additional responding by the fire and rescue services is likely to have a beneficial effect in 
supporting ambulance service response time performance, especially in relation to cardiac arrest 
calls.  In relation to the need not just to arrive on scene first but to take appropriate action, the 
next section illustrates in a very small sample the efficacy of CPR undertaken by fire and rescue 
service staff when co-responding to cardiac arrest calls. 
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Research-stream D: Cardiac arrest download 
data 
 
A data download within this research-stream refers to a recording of a patient’s clinical readings 
e.g. the echocardiogram (ECG) tracing of a heart rhythm, by a device: in this case an automated 
external defibrillator.  In many medical devices, the tracing is not only printed onto the paper 
report, it is also recorded as a data file.   This gives the user the option of either ‘downloading’ 
these data as computer files, or the file will be overwritten by continued use of the device.  The 
point in time at which this ‘deletion’ occurs will depend on the data capacity of the device.  After 
being overwritten, these patient data are usually not retrievable.   
The majority of defibrillators have this recording capacity which, after connection to the patient 
via either defibrillator pads or ECG dots, records the patient’s cardiac ECG continuously.  In 
addition, some defibrillators use complex impedance technology which can measure chest wall 
movement, tissue density and even cardiac output in the major blood vessels.  This allows a 
retrospective analysis of cardiac arrest download data files, to reveal both the quality of cardio 
pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and also the impact of this physical intervention on the cardiac 
arrest patient.   
Background 
Evidence suggests that four features are associated with a decreased chance of successful 
resuscitation following cardiac arrest:  lack of bystander CPR (bystander CPR is where a member of 
the public undertakes CPR before the arrival of medical assistance); unwitnessed arrest, non-
shockable rhythm and out of hospital location.  Survival from cardiac arrest is 8.7% with no 
bystander CPR compared to 11.3% with bystander CPR; 3.9% unwitnessed arrest compared to 
15.9% witnessed arrest; and 4.2% with non-shockable rhythm compared to 27.1% for a shockable 
rhythm (McNally et al., 2011).  Moreover the chance of successful defibrillation decreases by 23% 
for each minute that passes following collapse: a plateau is typically reached at approximately 5 
minutes, beyond which successful resuscitation is challenging (De Maio, Stiell, Wells, & Spaite, 
2003).  This initial 5 minutes is thought to represent the “electrical phase” of cardiac arrest that is 
most amenable to defibrillation, beyond this the arrest enters a “circulatory phase” in which it is 
suggested advanced cardiac life support measures such as the provision of pharmacological agents 
are more commonly associated with achieving a perfusing rhythm; this is supported by best in 
class cardiac arrest systems that look to achieve a 4 minute response in 90% of cases (Weisfeldt, 
2004).    
The efficacy of early access defibrillation is widely supported by international studies (Caffrey, 
2002; De Maio et al., 2003; Mosesso et al., 2002; Nichol et al., 2009).  However increasing the 
availability of automated external defibrillators (AEDs) is typically only part of the overall metrics 
that contribute to successful resuscitation.  Chest compression quality, in terms of rate and depth, 
aligned to rapid defibrillation that minimises the time not compressing the chest (pre-shock pause) 
have been evidenced as important components in the achieving return of spontaneous circulation 
(ROSC) (Edelson et al., 2006).  
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Cardiac arrest download data analysis  
The following analysis is derived from 17 defibrillator downloads from AEDs. The data from cardiac 
arrest events from these AEDs is stored as an electronic file; this presents an option of analysing 
the data for the presenting rhythm, shocks delivered (DC cardioversion) and the quality of chest 
compressions by rate and the duration of any pauses (interruptions in chest compressions).  The 
17 cardiac arrests were attended by a single county fire and rescue service co-responding between 
the 22nd December 2015 until the 1st December 2016. Each cardiac arrest was supported by their 
local ambulance service as a secondary response.   
Results 
The initial data demonstrate a reasonably even split in terms of gender (Figure 16) and witnessed 
versus unwitnessed arrest (Figure 17).   
 
Figure 16: Breakdown of cardiac arrest recordings by gender (n=17) 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Breakdown of cardiac arrests by whether witnessed or unwitnessed (n=17) 
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Bystander CPR was confirmed in (n=10) 59% of cases as illustrated in Figure 18.   
 
Figure 18: Breakdown of cardiac arrests receiving bystander CPR (n=17) 
 
The breakdown of presenting rhythms (Figure 19) demonstrates asystole and pulseless electrical 
activity (PEA), both non-shockable rhythms, as the most common comprising (n=10) 59%.   
 
Figure 19: Breakdown of cardiac arrests by presenting rhythm (n=17) 
 
Ventricular fibrillation (VF) and fine ventricular fibrillation (fVF) make up (n=6) 36% of the 
incidents; and both of these are shockable rhythms.  Only one case (6%) is indicated as an 
idioventricular (idioV) non-shockable rhythm.   
The rhythms prior to the first shock (Figure 20), which would have typically followed a period of 
two minutes of CPR, were shockable in 41% of the cases (n=7); the remainder (n=10) 59% were 
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indicated as unrecorded.  This figure matches the initial presenting rhythms indicated as non-
shockable and one might infer that those rhythms indicated as unrecorded were in fact non-
shockable.   
 
Figure 20: Presenting rhythms prior to first shock (n=17) 
 
Analysis of the presenting rhythms post first (Figure 21) and second shock (Figure 22) are 
disappointing with (n=10) 59% and (n=12) 70% indicated as not recorded.  Analysis of the non-
shockable rhythms indicates (n=5) 29% and (n=3) 18% post first and second shock respectively, 
demonstrating a downward trend. 
 
Figure 21: Presenting rhythms post first shock (n=17) 
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Figure 22: Presenting rhythms post second shock (n=17) 
 
Analysis of the final rhythms (Figure 23) demonstrates that non-shockable rhythms have remained 
at (n=10) 59%, however (n=5) 29% are indicated as a sustained rhythm (SR); this demonstrates an 
upward trend from (n=1) 6% post first and second shock.  Those rhythms showing as paced, 
indicate the presence of an internal pacemaker device that is picked up by the AED.   The mean 
compression rate (Figure 24) is indicated as 122 compressions per minute (range 103-148).    
 
 
Figure 23: Final rhythms (n=17) 
 
Final analysis was conducted using matched data from the ambulance service and the single 
county fire and rescue service to indicate the final outcomes at transfer of the patient to the 
emergency department.  Not all records (n=3) could be matched, although it is known that the 
presenting rhythm was asystole (non-shockable).  The analysis of (n=14) matched records between 
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the fire and rescue service and the ambulance service indicate that (n=4) 28% who presented in a 
shockable rhythm achieved return of spontaneous circulation (ROSC) at the emergency 
department; furthermore (n=3) 22% of those presenting in a non-shockable rhythm achieved 
ROSC.  A total of (n=7) 50% achieved ROSC at the emergency department for both shockable and 
non-shockable rhythms. 
The initial results from the AED downloads are promising, with a total of (n=7) 50% achieving ROSC 
at the emergency department.  The results must however be viewed with caution as the sample 
data is very small; a much larger study is needed to indicate whether this trend would continue.  
Moreover ROSC, whilst essentially restoring blood supply to the central nervous system thereby 
preventing further sequelae, is only a proxy measure of survival to discharge.  A large study of 
(n=4471) cardiac arrest victims randomised to either manual or mechanical chest compressions 
demonstrated that despite ROSC rates of 32% and 31% respectively, survival at 30 days had fallen 
to 6% and 7% in the same groups (Perkins et al., 2015). 
However, the provision of early defibrillation in shockable rhythms is widely accepted as 
contributing towards cardiac arrest survival, even in the hands of non-medical personnel including 
the lay public (Capucci, Aschieri, & Piepoli, 2002; Capucci, Aschieri, Piepoli, et al., 2002).  The 
success rates of implantable cardioversion defibrillators (ICD) in restoring perfusing rhythms 
following VF within 10 seconds of onset has been well documented (Connolly et al., 2000) thus the 
rationale for early intervention in the electrical phase of cardiac arrest. 
The results indicate that 28% of those presenting in a shockable rhythm achieved ROSC, whilst this 
is to be welcomed (and as a percentage compares well with best in class performance) the sample 
remains small, making inferences speculative.   
In this small sample, the mean chest compression rate (122) is still slightly higher (Figure 24) than 
that which is currently recommended by the Resuscitation Council of 100-120 compressions per 
minute (UK Resuscitation Council, 2016).   
 
 
Figure 24: Average compression rate per event (n=17) 
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However, firefighters who are trained for the highly physical demands of their profession are 
unlikely to fatigue easily and with the addition of feedback devices could achieve correct 
compression rate at scene.  The data did not allow for measurement of compression depth, this 
again is associated with defibrillation success and can be improved by the addition of feedback 
devices (Edelson et al., 2006).  Studies of (n=3) European prehospital services (including the 
London Ambulance service) showed that chest compression depth was suboptimal (Wik et al., 
2005); ensuring both correct rate and depth of compressions should be readily achievable by UK 
firefighters.    
Summary conclusion 
The data from such a small sample size limits the extent to which larger inferences can be made.  
The ROSC rates were good and would match well with other international best in class systems.  
The compression rate is a little high but could easily be corrected by additional training and the 
introduction of feedback devices.  Compression depth was not measured but, as indicated, is likely 
to be improved by feedback devices and training.  The use of ROSC can only be a proxy measure 
for survival to discharge and therefore must be viewed contextually.  A larger multi-centre trial 
with agreed data metrics would answer the question as to whether this performance can be 
replicated nationally; if so, it seems likely that the fire and rescue service could improve cardiac 
arrest outcomes. 
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Research-stream E: Qualitative telephone 
interviews 
 
This research-stream involved 26 interviews with staff from different fire and rescue services that 
took part in the NJC trial.  The interviews were conducted over the telephone with between one 
and three participants, who were mainly managers and sometimes other staff, who were 
participating in co-responding or wider work throughout the United Kingdom. 
Content of the responses from the semi-structured interviews have been analysed to identify the 
key issues identified by the participants. The semi-structured interviews allowed flexibility for the 
participant to raise the issues they considered important.  The interviews were transcribed 
verbatim and processes of thematic analysis have been employed to develop categories and key 
themes. 
Findings 
Key activities 
Firefighting was unconditionally identified as the key activity by the fire and rescue services.  Their 
wider medical activities were identified as: 
 Co-responding to high acuity calls, frequently referred to as Red 1 and Red 2 calls, although 
not all co-responders responded to Red 2 calls.   
 Attending in medical emergencies to assist in forced entries and also for police 
emergencies. 
 Assisting bariatric patients. 
 Telecare service response. 
 Non-emergency falls. 
 Warmth assessments. 
 Reducing injury from slips, trips and falls; installing aids to minimise risk. 
 Home safety checks to reduce the risk of fire in the home. 
 Signposting individuals to other agencies and providing equipment and assisting in the 
reduction of safety or security as and when required. 
 Safety work: training and inspection of premises for risk purposes. 
 Partnership with British Heart Foundation to improve public education around 
management of cardiac arrest. 
 Promotion of fire station events for CPR training for members of the public: Heartstart, Out 
of Hospital Cardiac Arrest strategy. 
 Safe and Well visits incorporating dementia awareness, alcohol harm and reduction, 
smoking cessation advice, dealing with loneliness and isolation. 
 First Contact, constructed from Exeter Data targeting the over 65s.   
 All Risk Protect – boarding up or via welfare warrants. 
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The biggest key activity for most stations was co-responding although it was evident that 
preventative work was expanding and being viewed by several participants as a growth area for 
future development to include a variety of activities such as administration of flu vaccinations to 
elderly people who were not able to easily get to their GP; or generic health screening activities 
involving routine measurement of blood pressure, blood glucose etc. Clearly participants 
acknowledged the need for education and training for fire and rescue staff around these activities 
to ensure knowledge and skill competency. However, these areas would benefit from further 
examination in the future to establish whether there is scope to utilise fire and rescue staff in the 
successful delivery of these screening and prevention programmes. 
It was interesting to note that whilst some fire and rescue services had been co-responding for 
some time, most areas had commenced co-responding relatively recently, many within the last 
year as a result of the NJC trials.  Some stations were developing wider participation schemes and 
were in the process of negotiating partnerships with other agencies including social care agencies 
and local councils.    
The key themes and issues raised by fire and rescue services are outlined below. 
Communication 
(a) Triage 
Problems occurred on some occasions with the initial call to the fire station.  Calls were not always 
appropriate for fire crew to respond to as, in the main, they were expecting Red 1 or Red 2 calls.  
The calls were sometimes outside of the scope of the trial. It was not apparent whether these 
inappropriate calls were triaged incorrectly by the call-taker or whether the caller misrepresented 
the nature of the incident in the first place. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreed at 
the start of the trial between the fire and rescue services and the ambulance services should have 
made clear to the organisations involved the criteria for emergency responding and there 
appeared to be a deviation from this MOU at times.   Overall, it appeared that as the trial 
progressed, the number of inappropriate calls declined for some areas and the quality of 
communication improved over time.  
(b) Dispatch systems 
Different systems were in use to mobilise firefighters to incidents.  In a majority of cases, after an 
initial call was received, usually via a 999 or 111 call, it was passed to the ambulance services’ 
dispatch centre where the decision is taken as to what resources to deploy including contacting 
the fire and rescue services if appropriate.  From this point, a variety of systems were used to 
mobilise crews such as pagers, airwave radios, or mobile phones.  How fire and rescue service 
resources were alerted depended on models used in the stations and arrangements with local 
ambulance services.  It also depended on whether co-responders were whole-time or retained 
staff and whether the co-responder was a lone responder, lived near the station, or the station 
was in a rural or urban area.  A number of different models of response were evident. The 
following issues were identified in relation to the systems used for mobilisation.  Not all areas 
raised the same issues: 
 There were technical problems with the fire and rescue service and ambulance service 
systems as, despite being relatively modern, there were no easy ways to talk to each other 
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directly which restricted the sharing of information directly.  Some managers felt that the 
technology needed to be improved. 
 If the mobilising system was on the fire appliance and a call was received whilst attending a 
fire incident, or the vehicle was out of range, this results in a refusal to accept the call. One 
area reported only three stations were involved in the trial and they were thus less flexible; 
but if the crew were unable to attend and had to decline this was acceptable practice. 
 Cardiac arrest calls were not always identified/triaged accurately resulting in some 
frustration when initially arriving on scene as the fire and rescue staff may have prepared 
themselves en route for a full cardiac arrest only to be stood down on arrival; or 
alternatively arriving on scene to find that the patient is in cardiac arrest when the 
firefighters were not expecting this clinical presentation. 
 As well as inhibitory factors to direct communication, there were some problems in control 
room to control room communication, especially in the early stages of the trials when staff 
seemed less certain as to who should be mobilised to which calls.  Initially a high number of 
incidents were not being passed on to the fire service; this was resolved over time through 
discussion and consultation with the ambulance services. 
 In one area the co-responding mobilising system was ‘really clunky’ so the crews changed 
to being mobilised directly by the fire and rescue service’s own control centre.  As 
ambulance services work in different ways to the fire and rescue services, there is a need 
to establish the most effective ways of communication. 
 Monthly meetings for volunteers, key stakeholders and control to review system efficiency 
was deemed to be a really useful activity in one fire and rescue service.  
 The importance of maintaining control of their own staff was expressed by managers, as 
they do not want a third party directly mobilising fire and rescue service staff. 
Experience of participation in the trial 
(a) Response  
‘The intention is to ‘give them [the patient] the best chance of survival’  
A common view from participants was that involvement in the trial would help and improve a 
person’s chances of recovery as expressed in the above quote.  The staff response to participating 
in the trial, was mainly viewed as very positive, and described by one manager as ‘overwhelmingly 
positive – all volunteered’. Another manager described the crews as being keen to respond as they 
were ‘…skilled and capable and acknowledge a public need’. Some participants felt that a few staff 
had less positive perspectives about the extended scope of practice for example:  some people 
viewed the trial as encroaching on the work of the NHS; some staff struggled with the ‘softer skill 
elements’, and ‘didn’t join the fire service to do this’; there were reports of political aspects to the 
reluctance especially a fear of being seen as taking work away from Paramedics, and concern over 
any financial remuneration for the extra responsibility; and some staff were apprehensive at the 
responsibility of the task. However, these experiences were perceived by the interview 
participants to be in the minority.   
There was no particular consensus in the interviews as to which category of calls the fire and 
rescue services should respond to.  Predominantly Red 1 calls were viewed as appropriate but, 
additionally responding to Red 2 calls was seen as enabling fire and rescue service staff to have 
more opportunities to use their skills recognising that it might benefit them in the longer term as 
55 
 
 
staff would maintain skill competence through having consistent levels of exposure to patient care 
and management.  
Responding to patients who had fallen (with or without injury) was seen as another area that had 
benefit to a large group of patients. Providing a falls service was seen as possibly verging on the 
social care domain but participants frequently referred to the potential for preventive work to be 
seen as an opportunity to counteract the latent capacity claim often directed at the fire and rescue 
services.  
Participants reported the majority of the workforce were happy to co-respond if the terms and 
conditions were right and cost effective. Some managers perceived there were specific benefits to 
the retained staff as ‘otherwise they would have been lost due to inactivity in the area’. 
Overall participants felt staff were positive about the impact co-responding can have in their own 
communities, through potentially improving patient experience and outcomes.  Some participants 
considered that many firefighters already possessed the skills necessary for co-responding, such as 
responding to cardiac arrests and using a defibrillator, as this was already part of their work.  In 
some instances teams had been co-responding for a number of years before becoming involved in 
the trial, whereas in the most part the trial had opened up a number of opportunities for fire and 
rescue service staff to be involved in new and emerging areas supporting health and social care 
providers. 
(b) Mobilisation 
‘…everything from a fully-equipped, fully staffed engine to a service Vauxhall Corsa with one or two 
people in it….. could be a minibus, estate car, a Galaxy, Corsa but what they’ll all have with them is 
in the boot of those vehicles, and on the fire engines is the kit necessary to undertake the safe and 
well checks.’  
The example above illustrates the different models utilised for responding in different stations. 
No matter which model of mobilisation was used, one area that was clear was that fire and rescue 
staff always remained under the control of the fire and rescue services and, at no time, was the 
primary commitment of the fire and rescue services to responding to fires compromised.  A 
‘breakaway clause’ , (otherwise known as a redirection policy), was reported by some participants 
where it was made very clear that ‘fire will be a priority and a fire engine will be re-directed’ if 
there is a fire requiring the appliance and firefighters. This was embedded in the MOU and issues 
of clinical governance were discussed prior to the commencement of the trial to ensure that both 
services were happy that patients and the public would be well served in the event there were 
competing priorities for the firefighters’ time.  Clinical governance was an issue that was 
frequently discussed in the interviews seemingly being the responsibility of the ambulance 
services, and it did cause some challenges in relation to training and timescales (discussed later). 
(c) Factors impacting on level of participation 
Starting in the trial was delayed for some crews/individuals because of a problem with the timing 
of the delivery of the ambulance service safeguarding training and Disclosure and Barring Security 
(DBS) checks. Delays in the DBS checks also affected firefighters in some stations being unable to 
participate along with their colleagues so there was a ‘staggered’ start in some areas. 
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Changes in the ambulance service categorisation process, due to participation in a national 
ambulance trial, affected participation in some areas.  This was seen as a point of frustration as 
fire and rescue staff in these locations noted a drop in demand when their ambulance services 
changed from one system to the new system (red, amber, green) as essentially this reduced the 
number of calls being categorised as red. Participants reported that once firefighters were 
comfortable in their new roles there was an appetite to be continuously involved and to have their 
involvement reduced was not welcomed. 
Another ambulance service changed protocols in terms of location and also changed the control 
team who were not familiar with the Emergency Medical Response. Some stations co-responded 
to Red 1 or similar calls only and therefore had a limited experience, whilst other stations 
responded to a variety of emergency calls with multi-role vehicles, and lone responders.    
There was no standardisation in the trial as to what type of calls the fire and rescue services would 
respond to for example some did not cover paediatrics, suicides or threatened violence. 
Participants suggested that in the post-trial evaluation that there should be consideration of 
whether there should be a national recommendation in relation to this.  
Some fire and rescue services were prescriptive in determining which calls they responded to.  
This was to ensure a sustainable workload on top of the other skills the firefighter has to maintain. 
For example, one participant described that their service responded to four call types only: cardiac 
arrest/at risk of cardiac arrest, unconscious, catastrophic haemorrhage and choking. These were 
agreed by the fire and rescue service and their local ambulance service as targeted areas of 
response for that fire and rescue service. 
(d) Response models 
Whole-time and retained stations participated in the trial. There were different models of 
response in evidence: in some areas the co-responder was in a car, in others a fire engine was 
mobilised.  Most responded in crews or in twos but in some stations there were single responders.  
Single responders doubled up in the early days of the trial in one station for the purposes of 
sharing experiences and building up confidence.  Teamwork has a long-standing culture in the fire 
service and moving to a solo responder model was considered a real obstacle. Because single 
responders are counter to active team maintenance, several fire and rescue services using this 
model provided another firefighter.  In some cases the fire service paid for the second firefighter 
to attend which was seen as unsustainable in the long-term. 
 (e) Co-responding 
‘…effectively our personnel have taken over the basics of the resuscitation enabling the Paramedic 
to use their more advanced skills to administer drugs and not having to be doing compressions or 
managing the basics.’  
The above description illustrating the expectation of the work of co-responding was reflected in 
similar contributions from other managers. People described different levels of involvement 
during co-responding in cardiac arrest situations. Crews have sometimes stood by depending on 
the number of resources dispatched to the event, but most frequently they have actively 
participated in scene management: moving the patient, assisting in resuscitation, assisting 
Paramedics with equipment.  There was a general feeling that Paramedics are relieved to get the 
help in a cardiac arrest– the firefighters support them by taking over core activities such as chest 
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compressions enabling the Paramedics to focus on advanced airway management, drug 
administration, fluid management etc. 
Some interviewees mentioned that there had been an impact on staff motivation when call 
volume reduced as they had been expecting consistent regular responding and it was not always 
clear why there was a reduction in call volume.  For most services there was a point when the 
demand reduced and frequently there did not seem to be a recurrent pattern as to why these 
quieter periods manifested themselves. 
(f) Inappropriate calls 
It was noted that sometimes firefighters had been mobilised to inappropriate incidents.  Some of 
the incidents that firefighters had responded to had placed them in difficult positions as it seemed 
that participants believed that firefighters prefer to be able to do something tangible. It was 
reportedly more stressful to be in situations where they felt they could not do anything practical 
to improve the situation.  Firefighters can find it frustrating ‘dealing with complex medical 
conditions which they can’t fix and [they] struggle to understand the fact that all we’re asking 
them to do is to ensure their condition doesn’t worsen …. until the correct health professional is in 
attendance.’  
The contributor continued to describe the responses by the firefighter may involve basic 
observations and ‘handholding’ which makes some staff feel awkward. He also raised staff 
concerns regarding their inability to respond to distressed family members during resuscitations 
and how some find supporting the family awkward, issues that were of concern to several 
interviewees.  Categories of incidents that crews/individuals attended included: unconscious, 
stroke, breathing difficulties, chest pain, overdose, intoxicated persons who have ‘passed out’ and 
needed their airway maintained, suicide (hangings), broken leg, drownings, pub fights (with police 
in attendance) and, in one instance, delivering a baby.  However, despite feeling somewhat 
inadequate in these types of cases, access to clinical support was available during incidents 
through telephone or radio contact to the ambulance service’s clinical hub.   
In another area, the fire and rescue service had been mobilised even if the ambulance service did 
not have an ambulance available.  This was not part of the MOU but nonetheless, although 
infrequent, it reportedly did happen. Consequently fire and rescue service staff were sometimes 
mobilised to inappropriate incidents, which was not seen by interviewees as best practice 
especially if the calls were to patients where fire service staff felt they were unable to do anything 
meaningful to support the patient. 
Another problem raised regarding inappropriate calls was the experience of having to wait for the 
ambulance to arrive, which on occasions was a long time.  Some crews have used the time to talk 
to the patient and on occasions even fitted a smoke alarm.  There was a feeling from several 
participants that staff prefer cardiac arrest calls as they can get in and do something useful like 
chest compressions, and then leave the scene as soon as they are no longer required – there was 
some attraction for some firefighters to jobs that were short in duration but high in intensity of 
activity; these were seen as more interesting than being involved in lower acuity activities such as 
safe and well checks. Although conversely there were examples given of staff preferring to be 
involved in some of the wider activities in terms of providing a variety of experience in role 
expansion.  
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(g) Non-emergency experiences 
Attending lower acuity calls on behalf of the ambulance service involved carrying out certain 
clinical observations in order to help clinicians at the end of the telephone determine whether 
additional resources are needed to send to those patients.  These observations included blood 
pressure, blood glucose and respiratory rates and were reported to the clinician in the emergency 
operations centre, who advised on further action.  In one example, the patient was then referred 
to the local authority falls team. Repeat callers in some of the non-emergency calls are often older 
people, who are frail, lonely and socially isolated and interviewees frequently commented on the 
potential for the fire and rescue services to make a big difference from a humanitarian perspective 
to the quality of life for these individuals. 
Training and development 
‘We use the ambulance service [for] clinical governance as they are the experts, and there is no 
statutory responsibility placed on us to respond to incidents.’  
Because activities to ensure clinical governance were the responsibility of the ambulance services, 
stipulations were made on the appropriate training.  A variety of training programmes existed for 
co-responding firefighters: some were delivered in conjunction with ambulance services, others 
independent of ambulance services, but these had nevertheless sanctioned by individual 
ambulance services. Minimum levels of training were required as part of the trial principles. Whilst 
that level was always in place, the extent to which co-responders had undergone further training 
was inconsistent across the different fire and rescue services. 
Examples of training courses provided prior to co-responding and wider work: 
 2-day course for medical life threatening calls. Ambulance service 3-day course for 
immediate emergency care. 
 Ambulance service familiarisation training, fire and rescue service base training and 
refresher training. 
 First aid course plus additional regional training from ambulance services. 
 Ambulance service course for clinical governance trainers to the prescribed level for 
competence in respiratory and cardiac arrests and life-threatening conditions. 
 Defibrillator training with ambulance service input. 
 Training to Intermediate Emergency Care level appropriate for community first responders.  
The ambulance service require a minimum of 2 day training for community first responders 
dealing with Red 1 and Red 2 calls on trauma incidents that are based on cardiac arrests 
and breathing difficulties. 
 In one fire and rescue service, all staff receive medical training for emergency medical 
response.  Extra training for the urban search and rescues teams was also given, which 
required specific training to a pre-defined medical standard. 
 A 16-hour bespoke course that focuses on high quality CPR and defibrillation in addition to 
ICAT first person or senior casualty care award. 
 Initial local training was provided by the ambulance service. 
 Safeguarding Level 2 training.   
 A local university provided training and on-going work with local nurse teams for follow-
ups in non-emergency falls. (RSPH Understanding Health Level 2.)  
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 A 5-day course with a combination of immediate emergency care combined with 
community first responders’ course that was clinically governed by ambulance service. 
 5 days training then 1 or 2 days of ‘uplift’ training (core principles of ambulance service, 
clinical governance, infectious disease control, moving and handling, patient record 
keeping, and CPR). 
 Single day first aid course for all staff with extra defibrillator and oxygen training validated 
by ambulance service.   
 4 days training with experienced Paramedic. 
 RNLI model of casualty care. 
‘I do think we need to look at our training for longer term.’ 
Training needs were seen to be a long-term issue, which was being addressed by the managers. 
Some areas provided on-going/refresher training, some in response to staff requests, which were 
also varied. New training courses were necessary to fit in with ambulance service changes and this 
could be problematic in that it might take a while before the firefighters could be updated to new 
policies or procedures. Working groups dealing with training were also in operation, as were 
feedback groups and training resources and it was through this system that additional training 
needs were identified such as managing grieving relatives; breaking bad news etc. 
It was recognised that education and training was important to ensure firefighters felt comfortable 
and competent in their expanding roles but that there would be a significant cost attributed to 
delivery of on-going education and training and this needs consideration if the trial is to be 
incorporated into daily work expectations within fire and rescue services. 
Preparation for staff 
‘…when their feet hit the ground, doing emergency medical response ….they’ve identified that we 
could have trained them better for different things.’  
Participants’ views on staff preparation were varied, as illustrated in the above quote.  Training 
was considered adequate before going live, but once staff had engaged in the trial these 
experiences led to the identification of more specific training and education needs – in particular 
the need to be trained in dealing with relatives, Do Not Resuscitate orders and using ‘softer skills’.  
Confronting patients and relatives during inappropriate calls (those that firefighters were not 
trained to deal with) was flagged as problematic, as highlighted in previous section. Prior to the 
trial some staff went out on observation with ambulance crews to alleviate their trepidation. 
Dealing so frequently with non-traumatic death had not been fully considered and although staff 
were more familiar with dealing with traumatic death (fires and road traffic collisions), managing 
what was termed as ‘benign’ death and the frequency with which staff were exposed to this was 
unanticipated. In the main there was a feeling amongst the participants that there was adequate 
post incident debrief support provided, which they reported was in contrast to their ambulance 
staff colleagues who, in the firefighters’ opinions, appeared to be relatively unsupported in 
comparison. There was positive feedback from firefighters about the level of support they 
received in relation to managing traumatic situations, but a demand for more education 
surrounding the management of non-traumatic death and bereaved relatives. 
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Confidence levels amongst staff were said to have ‘massively increased’ since expanding the role 
of firefighters into gaining entry and co-responding, with a feeling that this work had also 
improved their confidence and skills when attending ‘core business’ calls such as road traffic 
collisions. 
Relationship with ambulance service 
‘…not replacing the ambulance service, we respond alongside them.’  
The above quote was a common theme reflected amongst participants in relation to co-
responding. Co-responding provided an opportunity to break down professional barriers on the 
ground and understand more about the demands of each agency. 
 For some co-responders there was a mixed relationship with the ambulance service as, on 
occasions, the ambulance crews were unaware the fire and rescue service had been dispatched to 
the incident. Generally it was reported that, as the trial progressed, better relationships developed 
which was welcomed by both groups of staff. 
A survey carried out in one area found the relationship with the ambulance staff was very positive 
and reported feedback from the ambulance service that the trial helped ‘to realise how 
professional the crews are.’   
Similar praise from an ambulance service was echoed in another area where they had a positive 
patient outcome from a cardiac arrest: ‘The net result of this superb display of teamwork, involving 
10 people, each person with a specific role to play, was a return of spontaneous circulation on 
arrival at hospital.’  
There were few issues raised at front-line level but in some cases problems in communication at 
management levels affected teams on the ground. One ambulance service was seen as rigid and 
bureaucratic as they were more concerned with safeguarding training than appropriate medical 
training. This was considered frustrating as the start of the trial was delayed due to this. Tension 
was apparent with another ambulance trust as there was no effective internal communication, 
resulting in managerial information not getting to the shop floor. In this case, during the early days 
of the trial, ambulance crews were not informed of the fire and rescue service participation which 
did not aid relationships or collaborative working. Mistrust was noted with senior managers and 
there was tension over funding issues. However with time and considerable work from both 
agencies it appeared that these issues become less problematic as the trial progressed. 
In several cases delays from the ambulance service clarifying the necessary level of medical care 
that affected equipment, training and skillsets hindered starting time for the trial. As mentioned 
earlier, problems also arose when some ambulance services participated in a national ambulance 
trial which re-categorised calls to red, amber, green and this impacted on the volume of calls to 
those fire and rescue services working with them.  In one case, despite regular joint meetings, this 
was not communicated to the fire and rescue service and so was frustrating. 
However, senior managers had regular joint meetings in some areas and were able to discuss and 
address the challenges for the trial. Meetings were held more regularly for some when compiling 
the Memorandum of Understanding and one area had established a committee to oversee the 
Memorandum of Understanding. 
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The fire and rescue services and ambulance services shared the same buildings in some areas, 
which was beneficial in developing relationships and appeared to facilitate quicker communication 
and developments within the trial.  Sharing buildings was seen to have economic benefits as well 
as developing professional relationships. 
Impact on core business 
‘Statutory responsibilities were not impacted on by provision of response to medical emergency’.  
There were no reports of any statutory work directly affected by the trial.  A priority to attend fire 
calls was paramount and protected.  Processes were in place to ensure that the capacity of the fire 
and rescue service to attend fires was never compromised due to participating in the wider work 
and co-responding. Managers were aware of the product of their own success in firefighting: 
‘…fastest fire and rescue service to life-risk fires in the country, and obviously, we seek to maintain 
that, and that’s why we’ve got some low fire deaths.’  
This success enabled the fire and rescue services to branch out into other areas of work such as 
co-responding, viewing this work as an asset to increasing firefighters’ skills. The need to keep the 
identity of the fire and rescue service within the political climate and balance that with the need to 
embrace change in the firefighting rolemap was expressed. Also, based on experiences of some of 
the new work undertaken, operational management of the co-responding call outs will have to be 
considered carefully, otherwise there could be professional compromises as described by one 
manager in the following quote: ‘[We] cannot get into a position where fire engines are 
‘babysitting’ until ambulance turns up.  We cannot get into moral dilemmas of having to leave 
vulnerable patients if called to [an] inappropriate call.’  
Protocols were in place which were followed rigidly and were essential to ensure staffing levels 
were able to respond to a fire incident. Primacy was reserved for the appliance and measures 
were in place if there was a problem. 
Finance 
 ‘…should have had a commitment to the level of resources that was going to be required to 
actually make this happen right from the outset, from both sides.’  
‘Finance’ was a section in the interview schedule, but clearly in conversation people were making 
a best guess rather than having specific detail so whilst this gives an overall idea of what things 
needed to be costed, caution should be given to the actual numbers per se.  
Estimates of cost and financial arrangements were not standardised across the trial and they were 
varied and decided between the individual ambulance service and the local fire and rescue service. 
Not all participants gave full details and most of the expenditure is related to emergency 
responding. The following areas were identified as incurring costs and just give a general flavour of 
the differences:  
Training 
The different fire and rescue services approached funding differently.  Examples were given where 
the ambulance service paid for training of the firefighters to ensure they had the appropriate skills 
to manage the agreed level of calls and patient presentations.  
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The scope of training, and how it was costed, varied between fire and rescue authorities.  
Managers gave a range of examples: 
 £13,600 was the cost of training to one fire and rescue service. 
 Driver training was an issue especially for the single responder. 
 One fire and rescue service paid for all training including driver training.  
 One fire and rescue service provided only driver training. 
 One fire and rescue service spent £300,000 on training and still has 250 crew to be trained. 
Additional call outs for staff/retention 
Depending on which staff were involved in the co-responding (whole-time or retained) the costs of 
staffing also varied: 
 Crews were salaried therefore no additional staffing costs. 
 Wage costs were incurred with additional call outs. 
 The fire and rescue service pays for the attendance of a second person at a co-responding 
incident, while the ambulance service pays for first person. 
Hepatitis B vaccinations 
Because it was a trial, the costs incurred for inoculations varied: 
 Paid for by the fire and rescue service, £2900. 
 Inoculation was not enforced during the trial.   
Consumables 
The ambulance service often reimbursed fire and rescue services for the disposable medical 
equipment, or just replaced them at scene.  
Vehicles and fuel 
Costs for vehicles and fuel depended on the model of co-responding: 
 The single responder uses their own car, and mileage is reimbursed by the ambulance 
service.  
 Ambulance service bought and insured two cars. 
 The fire and rescue service provided a separate vehicle. 
 Vehicles provided by both fire and rescue service and ambulance service. 
 Ambulance service funded vehicle. 
Equipment 
Costs varied between fire and rescue services for equipment, for example: 
 Blue lights and overalls cost one fire and rescue service £4350, although other areas had 
these provided by the ambulance services. 
 Bag mask and valve provided for first responders by the ambulance service; the fire and 
rescue service provided defibrillator. 
 The ambulance service paid for all equipment. 
 The fire and rescue service provided all equipment. 
Disclosure and Barring checks 
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Costs varied between fire and rescue services for Disclosure and Barring Services (DBS) checks, for 
example: 
 Fire and rescue service paid £1549 for the checks. 
 Ambulance service paid for DBS checks. 
 DBS checks were already carried out before the trial. 
Replacement staff costs 
Managers were able to provide examples for a range of other costs that were also incurred, that 
were perhaps less obvious.   
Examples of additional staffing costs incurred included: 
 The project manager for the trial was not replaced in his current position. Applying for a 
replacement would have incurred more costs. 
 Ten people were taken off operational duties for a week’s training but there was no 
financial recompense.  
Administration 
Some additional administrative costs were identified, including the need for some staff compiling 
data for the trial. 
Having an additional administration team for IRS (Incident Recording System) incurred extra costs. 
General comments on costs 
‘What does a life cost?’  
A powerful comment, and one which for decades has been impossible to answer.  However what 
is clear is that health and social care agencies have limited budgets and services are constrained by 
costs. The same applies to fire and rescue services and the message was clear from the 
interviewees as illustrated in the following quote: ‘If this is to become firefighting work in the 
future the NJC will need to address funding issues.’  
A number of interviewees made general comments about costs for the future, particularly if the 
trial is to become business as usual.  For several fire and rescue services a cost recovery scheme 
with the ambulance services was in effect and funded as the co-responder scheme. Additionally 
some fire and rescue services are negotiating costs with other social care agencies in relation to 
wider work activities. Concerns were expressed regarding the financial implications of the scheme, 
particularly a need to be aware that if the service becomes free to ambulance services there will 
be implications with regard to responses: it was felt that it may not be sustainable if healthcare 
related call volume increases and the fire service has to absorb the costs of delivering this service. 
 
Challenges 
The challenges posed by co-responding and wider work were explored with participants. 
(a) Staff terms and conditions 
Because the trial has been extended, after a year in some areas the staff wanted remuneration for 
carrying out extra responsibilities. Some firefighters expressed their concern at their increased 
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responsibilities and pressure the trial had incurred, but at the same time there were more 
frequently reports that participating in this type of work increased staff enthusiasm and was seen 
as an attractive proposition in relation to professional development. 
Disclosure checks were a problem, as some staff had not disclosed appropriately, and enhanced 
checks necessary for the trial delayed the start date.  In some cases there were delays in DBS 
checks administered by the ambulance services that meant staff could not participate in the trial. 
This led to a staggered implementation amongst staff groups which was not viewed positively and 
so fire and rescue service managers invested time and energy in getting these elements resolved 
as quickly as possible so as to sustain their staff group’s interest in participating in the trial. 
There was mention in one fire and rescue service that retained staff with other responsibilities had 
difficulties with the volume of medical calls on top of fire calls, as they were unable to find time to 
rest. Despite being given flexibility to switch off the pager, some of these staff felt they had a 
moral obligation to their community and they did not want to do this. The notion of responsibility 
to their local community was clearly represented throughout the interviews as it appeared that 
fire and rescue service staff identify strongly with their local communities as frequently they live 
and work in the same area. 
There was some confusion about the health risks to firefighters working more closely with the 
general public and there appeared to be no consensus about the need for 
innoculations/vaccinations such as Hepatitis B. It was felt by some participants that there should 
be a national standard for healthcare prerequisites just as there is within ambulance services. 
 (b) Inter-professional attitudes and barriers 
At times it was felt that the ambulance services could have contributed more to the 
implementation of the co-responding, although equally there were reports of excellent 
collaboration. 
The number of coordinators overseeing the trial in the ambulance service may not have been 
adequate in some cases which participants felt impacted on trial commencement dates or delayed 
resolution of issues that cropped up during the trial. In particular, areas of clinical governance 
were problematic at times especially if fire and rescue service staff were trying to seek advice 
and/or clarification of situations whilst on scene with the patient(s) and they could not access the 
support services in place (such as telephone clinical support because the lines were busy). On 
occasion this led to firefighter dissatisfaction with the support mechanisms as they were left not 
knowing what to do for their patient at that time. 
One participant in one area spoke about how a ‘collective concept of operations’ has helped to 
engage the ambulance staff, but mentioned that there are still cultural differences between the 
two services that are ‘really hard to crack’. There is work to be done as to how to blend the two 
services whilst maintaining distinct and unique elements present within the two professional 
groups. 
(c) Political influences 
Several interviewees raised the impact of local and national politics on the development of the 
trial.  These were sometimes seen as obstacles in relation to whether or not the trial will be 
continued and ultimately become day-to-day business for fire and rescue services.  
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Some participants identified that some firefighters were reluctant to engage in the trial over 
concerns that the fire and rescue service might be seen as taking over ambulance service jobs, and 
some firefighters are apprehensive at the new responsibilities and fears around changes in the fire 
and rescue services. It had been challenging to engage some of these individuals in positive 
dialogue and action in relation to the development and implementation of the trial. 
Some people reported that long standing opposition to co-responding has impacted upon the 
national negotiations, which has manifested in some local resistance to participation.  
It appeared interviewees welcomed the initiative to produce this independent evaluation of the 
trial as participants unanimously agreed that the trial should become usual practice for fire and 
rescue services and they were interested to see whether other fire and rescue services were 
having similar experiences. 
It was also apparent that in the early stages of the trial many ambulance service staff were unsure 
of the political influences on the implementation of this trial and expressed concerns to 
firefighters about fearing a ‘takeover’ of their professional roles.  As time passed in the trial it 
appears that this fear subsided as it was clear that firefighters were working in support roles in 
healthcare and as reported earlier ambulance service staff welcomed this assistance identifying 
the positive contribution that the fire and rescue service staff were making to healthcare 
provision. 
(d) Co-responding  
I’ve seen more deaths in the last 6 months than I have in 15 years.’   
Co-responding, compared to some of the other wider work fire and rescue services were 
conducting, had some specific challenges.  As noted earlier, crews have been sent to inappropriate 
incidents.  Conversely there have been missed calls to incidents.  One fire and rescue service was 
concerned about the effectiveness of the mobilising system to triage incidents initially to the 
highest call category: these calls should then be downgraded as further information is gathered, 
but this was not happening which contributed to attending inappropriate calls.  
There have been some incidents when crews were confused over ‘Do not resuscitate’ instructions. 
The guidance to firefighters was, if in doubt, proceed with CPR and contact the clinical advice line. 
In addition, participants reported that some firefighters had difficulty in recognising life extinct 
placing them in awkward situations. These situations have been traumatic for a few individuals, as 
is dealing with grieving relatives and delivering bad news.  Although firefighters attend traumatic 
scenes in their own work these incidents are new and traumatic in a different way.  ‘We’ve not 
sent them before to people’s houses to deal with mums, dads, brothers, sisters who are actively 
dying in front of their relatives’. 
Being dispatched to cardiac arrest calls and finding that actually the patient is alive and possibly 
not even meeting the criteria of a high acuity clinical presentation can be frustrating. At times 
firefighters were sceptical about whether they were just sent to random calls just to stop the 
clock. One fire and rescue service sent their staff to spend time with call-takers to see how 
patients are triaged. This demonstrated that, on occasions, telephone triage is difficult and is not 
always an exact science especially if the caller is giving less than accurate information which can 
result in an inappropriate call priority being allocated to both ambulance and fire service staff.  
66 
 
 
A separate issue arises for firefighters attending Red 2 incidents.  There can be a longer waiting 
time for ambulances to reach Red 2 incidents depending on how busy the service is at the time, 
and this can mean crews/individuals staying longer at the scene sometimes in situations which the 
firefighters perceive as uncomfortable as they do not know what they can do to assist that patient.  
One crew waited with a patient for three and a half hours for an ambulance, although this is the 
exception rather than the rule.  In another fire and rescue service there was a case where the 
firefighters were left waiting with a patient and were unable to get through to the ambulance 
service’s clinical support desk as it was busy.  The firefighters decided to transport the patient to 
hospital despite that being against the advice and guidance they were given.  It must be said that 
in the serious adverse event investigation that followed this decision, it was identified that this 
action probably saved that patient’s life, however the manager was clear that they needed to 
make sure systems are in place to prevent that happening again - ‘it was a positive outcome, but 
it's something that we want to avoid at all costs.’  
Finally, mobilisation caused problems with time delays as some retained firefighters had to collect 
the vehicle from the fire station after they had been contacted to provide an emergency medical 
response.  This meant that the response time to the call was unnecessarily protracted.  Again 
there are different models in different fire and rescue services as some retained staff take the 
vehicle home with them as they are ‘on-call’, which subsequently reduces their response times to 
on scene.  Looking at models across the UK to establish best practice is essential to ascertain a 
best fit mode of response to improve on scene times, which subsequently may impact on patient 
outcome. 
(d) Personnel issues 
Responding to forced entry calls and co-responding has exposed crews to far greater levels of 
death than previously. Various welfare assistance programmes and strategies have been 
established by fire and rescue services to deal with the effect.  These include referrals to the 
occupational health service, debriefing services and raising management awareness of such issues.  
In addition, in one fire and rescue service operational decisions have been made, following a run 
of traumatic incidents, not to send crews out until they had sufficient periods of recovery both 
physically and mentally.   
Safeguarding issues have also been noted in co-responding, and in one fire and rescue service led 
to a review of training and an airwave radio for co-responding crew.  
One fire and rescue service reported that crews would rather work in pairs, possibly reflecting the 
impact of the fire and rescue service ‘watch culture’. That said, it helps to have one person deal 
with the relatives at the scene, whilst the other deals with the patient as they can support each 
other. Watch culture was clearly viewed as beneficial and supportive by the interviewees with 
people expressing that working closely in a team can result in confidence building. 
Staff confidence was reported to have improved for those participating in the trial and anxiety 
dissipated as the trial progressed.  Some fire and rescue services also noted that co-responding 
helped to retain and recruit staff as it was reported that staff wanted to be more involved and 
active during a shift. 
As alluded to earlier, one area of concern is that, through expanding the role of firefighters, they 
have been exposed to more death than in their standard work but in a different context, leading 
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to concerns around their psychological welfare. Many of the cardiac arrest calls are to elderly 
people, frequently in their late 80s and 90s who have multi pathology and often reduced chance 
of survival.  Equally, firefighters reported struggling with the decision of having to resuscitate 
these patients especially if they were frail – the notion of ‘futile resuscitation’ is a concept that 
ambulance staff are well acquainted with but firefighters less so. Strategies and services have 
been expanded to address and support staff with some of these more sensitive issues that they 
are being faced with.   
Value to the community 
Some areas had media publicity to launch the trial, while some felt the public have not had 
enough information about the trial and are still surprised when a fire engine turns up to an 
incident. 
Fire and rescue services did not report any negative feedback from the public, and felt that people 
did not care as long as they were getting a medical intervention. One fire and rescue service had 
conducted some consultation with the public, and found that although people were comfortable 
with co-responding, they did not want the service to compromise on its statutory duties. However, 
another fire and rescue service reported instances when the public have been confused about fire 
crews attending, particularly when the incident is dealing with something like a stroke and the 
crew are unable to do anything other than ‘handholding’. 
Small, close communities, which are more isolated, rely on the co-responding service more than 
larger communities with a good infrastructure for health and social care.  Participants report that 
many service users have recognised that firefighters are saving lives through the co-responding 
scheme and frequently participants identified that the public state they do not mind who turns up 
as long as someone helps their friend and/or family member – especially if they are in cardiac 
arrest.  Firefighters often live in the area they are co-responding in so are known to the local 
public, which is beneficial but can also be stressful especially if the patient’s outcome is poor.  
Moving forward with the scheme 
All participants saw a future for expanding the roles of firefighters but many expressed some 
demands in order to ensure it is sustainable. The future of the scheme is complex and dependent 
on a national agreement.  Other factors are influential such as the review of the ambulance 
response times. There is an acceptance amongst participants that there will be some medical 
response in the future, and all can see a role for such a scheme because of the massive demand on 
ambulance services and their call volumes; but there was recognition that there has to be a 
balance so fire and rescue service priorities are not compromised.   
It was suggested that skillsets may not have to be developed further than ‘first person on the 
scene intermediate level’ as Paramedics will arrive to provide clinical care; and one respondent 
suggested it might be helpful to contract an occupational doctor to provide the fire and rescue 
service with its own clinical governance. 
There was a suggestion that relationships with ambulance services will have to be more closely 
aligned should co-responding become business as usual.  Also there would be a need to develop 
relationships with other agencies such as clinical commissioning groups, local health services, local 
authorities and health and well-being boards to advise the fire and rescue service on the wider 
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work they could usefully undertake.  Some stations already offer a range of services such as 
telecare and falls recovery services that could be commissioned.  Fire and rescue services already 
respond to miscellaneous incidents, so the view of some respondents was that adding emergency 
and medical response would not be a ‘great leap’ and should not impact on the budget. Working 
with representative bodies to identify longer-term ambitions for the fire and rescue service was 
suggested as a step forward. 
There is a drive by fire and rescue services to work more closely with a variety of other health and 
social care agencies apart from ambulance services, as the role of firefighters has changed. A 
number of participants felt the new work should be part of a contractual agreement, and that 
clarity is needed from a national level on the rolemap of firefighters.  
Finally there was a view from some that funding for the expanding work will have to be 
guaranteed and adequate. 
Overview 
Interviewees felt that participation in the trial became easier as staff became more confident and 
gained more experience.  Working in teams was helpful as this is part of the fire and rescue service 
culture.  Responding to traumatic situations within a different environment to usual fire incidents 
raised different stresses, as there was more exposure to death.  Some areas had problems with 
mobilisation for three reasons: system problems related to misunderstanding for call handlers; 
teams were mobilised to inappropriate calls; and, some ambulance trusts participated in a 
national trial which affected categorisation of calls and reduced the demand for responding from 
fire and rescue services.  
Generally speaking managers thought staff felt positive about participating in the activities.  
Training courses had provided opportunities to develop new skills that they were keen to utilise.  
Retained staff were usually located in their communities and were positive about their 
contribution to the community in which they live.  Following changes in ambulance service 
categorisation of calls, staff in some areas were disappointed that they were not utilised as much 
in the latter stages of the trial. The biggest concerns highlighted by staff were:  
(a) The difficulties experienced with relatives following fatalities. Staff sometimes felt 
unprepared and untrained for this aspect of the work, although some staff were able to 
respond very well in these circumstances. 
(b) Being dispatched to inappropriate incidents where they did not have the necessary skills 
to support the patient. 
(c) Waiting for an ambulance to arrive and having to provide care they were untrained for. 
Managers provided support for staff in respect of the exposure to more ‘benign’ death and in 
some instances provided training courses on how to deal with grieving and bereaved relatives.  
Liaison meetings with the ambulance service raised the issues regarding inappropriate calls in 
some areas.  Waiting times for ambulances to collect patients reflected the demand on ambulance 
services. 
Ambulance services and the fire and rescue services were the major funders for the activities.  
Often both of these services jointly financed the activities. Protocols and standards for training 
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were mainly established by the ambulance service, which caused delays in some instances. In a 
minority of cases other streams of funding such as clinical commissioning groups and the Fire 
Transformation Fund had made contributions.  Responding to emergency incidents was reported 
to be a cost mutual arrangement for some areas with a proviso the crew arrived at the scene 
within a specified time.  Each area had different experiences, needs and expenditure. Hidden 
costs, particularly relating to staff who were managing the projects were identified. Overall there 
was a general view the activities were benefitting patients and assisting ambulance services 
without encroaching on the ‘core business’ of the fire and rescue services. Other activities such as 
Safe and Well checks were being expanded and in some cases verging into the domain of other 
health and social care services.  Future plans were being made to provide commissioning services 
with new partners.  
National agreements, political pressure and the cooperation of other professional bodies are most 
influential in the way forward for these activities. Participants acknowledged the scheme has been 
welcome but felt that if it is to continue it will need support from the Fire Brigades Union and the 
ambulance services’ trade unions.  Crucially, participants also recognised it would need adequate 
funding and political support.  Alongside this there was an acknowledgement that fire and rescue 
services have to move forward and embrace change without compromising their statutory duties 
or identity and whilst retaining autonomy.    
Summary conclusion 
• Overall the participants unanimously agreed that this type of work should continue for fire and 
rescue services. 
• There was clear recognition that this work must not impact (and has not impacted) on fire and 
rescue services’ ‘core business’. 
• Different areas participated in the trial in different ways depending on their location and local 
agreements.   
• There was no standardisation of training, although agreed minimum levels appeared to have 
been achieved. 
• Models of dispatch varied between fire and rescue services, and there was no consensus on an 
ideal model for response to calls. 
• There was no consensus as to which calls fire and rescue services should attend, although 
there were indications that staff were more interested in Cat A Red 1. 
• Funding arrangements varied between different co-responding and wider work agreements. 
• Some fire and rescue services expressed concerns over the management of clinical 
governance. 
• There was a general perception of improved relationships with the ambulance service and 
inter-professional working which spread beyond the trial activities. 
• Participants noted co-responding had also led to the improved confidence of fire and rescue 
service staff at fire service incidents, such as patient management at road traffic collisions. 
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• There was some recognition that firefighters understandably lacked knowledge about the 
complexities of patient assessment and that targeting staff to a narrower focus of patients 
might enhance clinical competence and confidence rather than spreading staff across a much 
wider range of patients with complex clinical presentations. 
• Fire and rescue services were mainly involved in co-responding incidents; some fire and rescue 
services reported wider work in the interviews, but those who did identified that activities 
were verging into clinical preventive work such as Safe and Well checks and prevention and 
management of slips, trips and falls. 
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Vignettes of wider work activities 
There were many different examples of participation in wider work beyond co-responding to high 
acuity calls.  Some examples are presented here and several more excellent examples can be 
found in the Local Government Association’s (2015b) publications ‘Beyond fighting fires: the role 
of the fire and rescue service in improving the public ‘s health’ and the 2016 publication ‘Beyond 
fighting fires 2: fire and rescue service transformation’. 
Vignette 1 
Support for non-emergency falls and wider health and wellbeing checks.  
Safe and Well Checks  
Safe and Well visits had been in place for 12 months in this fire and rescue service targeting the 
most vulnerable people in the community who were identified in a referral pathway by social 
housing groups, local councils, the ambulance service or the police.  A visit is booked and the 
person is visited by the crew on duty.  The checks are a standard safe and well visit and now 
include some road safety advice which will include tyre tread depths.  This fire and rescue service 
works with Age UK and is exploring new areas to expand this work.  They are considering doing 
safe and well plus checks which will be a commissioned service.   
Non-emergency falls  
This commissioned scheme had been running for 44 weeks in two geographical areas covered by 
this fire and rescue service. In one area there have been 470 incidents; the other has been 
operating for 30 weeks and has had over 1,300 incidents.  The ‘patient’ wears a telecare 
pendant that is activated by the individual if they fall.  They are then connected to a local handling 
centre who alert the local fire and rescue service.  The fire and rescue service will respond within 
40 minutes.  Clients tend to be elderly, frail people who have social care packages.  Some 
firefighters have found dealing with this aspect of work difficult because it is dealing with people 
at end of life as opposed to an emergency.  In order to address this, training sessions have been 
organised by the local university’s Faculty of Health, with additional work with local care nurse 
teams.   If there is any indication of a medical condition causing the fall, then an ambulance is 
called.  
Working with the ambulance service the fire and rescue service identified specific kit necessary for 
this work. Equipment for lifting has been acquired and new techniques have been 
developed.  Three fire and rescue service crew members will attend the call.  Staff are mostly 
positive about participating in this work, as they believe that rescuing someone within 45 minutes 
gives a better recovery outcome than if a person lies unattended for 3 hours or more – and 
certainly with some clinical presentations that is the case. There has been ‘no detrimental effect 
on our responses to fires.’  A number of callers did not have a fall and were elderly frail, lonely and 
isolated people who knew that someone would come and have a talk to them, and several of 
these were repeat callers.  
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Vignette 2  
Multi-agency vulnerability assessments.  
The multiagency vulnerability team, a relatively new project, involves health, fire and 
police representatives who carry out multi-agency vulnerability assessments in respect of 
prevention and protection with a view to identifying vulnerable people before the emergency 
services are contacted.   
Another similar project, running for 18 months in a deprived area that is jointly resourced with 
health, is focussed on improving the safety in houses.  The aim of this project is to reduce the 
demand on the public services as there is a high level of crime, fire activity and ambulance activity 
in this geographical area. Managers felt that staff enjoy this work in a multi-agency context as they 
are making a home safer, healthier and more secure.  Links with health centres have also been 
made, where staff can refer patients for a check. These principles will be incorporated within the 
traditional home fire safety checks in the future.    
 
Vignette 3 
Safe and Well Checks. 
The content of this fire and rescue service’s Safe and Well visit, and the subsequent referral 
pathways and training package that underpin the delivery, was devised by a working party that 
included local NHS Trusts, local authority public health and social care teams and Age UK. 
This is seen as beneficial as it is a collaborative venture which has informed service provision 
based on expert opinion and guidance – both in relation to the equipment used and the advice 
given by fire and rescue service staff during Safe and Well visits.  These subject specialists have 
also provided staff with appropriate education and professional development to ensure the 
effective implementation of these visits.  
This fire and rescue service is developing an evaluation programme in conjunction with their 
health and social care partners to assess cost efficacy and effectiveness of the services that are 
being provided.  
Safe and Well checks also include warmth assessments and provision of risk reduction 
equipment.  Fall at rest equipment can be provided, such as non-slip mats, non-slip adhesive pads 
to go under chair/bed castors, and touch lights to make a person safer particularly at night.  Also 
included in the Safe and Well checks are dementia awareness, alongside alcohol harm and 
reduction, smoking cessation and general wellbeing. 
The area served by this part of the fire and rescue service is deprived and targeted for supportive 
education for this reason, as incidents of fire are linked to alcohol misuse, heavy smoking, drug use 
and social deprivation. They aim to do around 11,000 safe and well visits per year in areas with 
individuals who are known to be vulnerable.  In addition to their firefighters they have access to 
staff who are expert in disability issues and are experienced working with individuals from ethnic 
minority groups who may have additional needs. Referral criteria are clear, as is the criteria for 
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intervention in relation to the provision of risk reduction equipment. An assessment is made and 
then, if needed, a referral is made to an appropriate agency.  Staff are participating in this work 
‘providing we’ve got the training’.  Anecdotes of the help provided has been given by the crews for 
example in one instance a lady was ‘absolutely freezing to death’ as she couldn’t afford to fix her 
boiler.  Firefighters examined her boiler and discovered she had turned the thermostat down and 
had been living in the cold for several months.  They now call in every two weeks to check on her.  
The director of a health service provider recognised the benefits of these checks, which are 
estimated to cost £10 per household, and agreed ‘right, you are going to do 10,000 at £10 … that’s 
£100,000, so that equates roughly to about three broken legs…this makes complete economic 
sense that we actually fund this.’  
 
Vignette 4 
Out of Hospital Cardiac Arrest Strategy (Scotland). 
‘It is much wider than co-responding’ 
The Out of Hospital Cardiac Arrest (OCHA) strategy produced by a broad range of stakeholders, 
arose out of a report by Her Majesty’s Fire Service Inspectorate who investigated arrangements in 
the (Scottish) Fire and Rescue Service and involvement for medical emergencies and partnership 
with the (Scottish) Ambulance Service.  The purpose of the report was to consider ‘maximising 
opportunities to contribute to community safety, by the acquisition and use of defibrillators and 
other medical equipment, in collaboration with the (Scottish) Ambulance Service.’   The (Scottish) 
Fire and Rescue Service pledged its commitment to the OCHA strategy and commenced working in 
partnership with the (Scottish) Ambulance Service in co-responding trials to out of hospital cardiac 
arrests. The trials were launched in November 2015 and coincided with European Restart the 
Heart Day.   
Another aspect of the (Scottish) government strategy was to ‘reduce the inequalities’ in relation to 
health and social care.  As a consequence the (Scottish) fire and rescue service is including the 
provision of CPR training as part of the home fire safety programme.  This has been rolled out in 
three towns that have been evidenced based from the (Scottish) Ambulance Service in a 
partnership with the British Heart Foundation and there are rescue kits in every fire station.  
Members of the public are encouraged to come to the fire stations to receive CPR training from 
the staff.  A launch in November 2015 at a local school was used to promote this service and there 
are plans to introduce CPR training into the school curriculum across Scotland.  
 
Vignette 5 
Attending non-injury falls on behalf of the ambulance service. 
‘A bespoke team’ ‘ 
‘…. putting a smile back on people’s faces’ 
Calls for people who have fallen, without injury who cannot get up come through either 111 or the 
999 service and are triaged at source.  Once identified as a non-clinical fall with no injuries the fire 
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service are mobilised to attend.  When the firefighter(s) get on scene, they undertake clinical 
observations such as blood pressure, blood glucose, and respiratory rates.  These are relayed to 
the clinician over the phone at the clinical hub, who asks further clinical questions if required.  
Once given authorisation by the clinician, the firefighter is then able to move the person to a place 
of safety and if appropriate refer them to the local authority falls team’s urgent care practitioners.  
If there are any doubts about the clinical presentation of the patient, an ambulance is dispatched.   
Besides being able to refer to the local authority falls team, facilities are available to put resources 
in place as firefighters are being trained to fit support rails and other falls prevention equipment 
as required.    
Another route for referring people who have fallen without an injury falls is through a social 
enterprise such as City Health Care Partnership. Calls generally come from clinicians, nurses, or 
domiciliary care nurses.  On average there are one and half calls a day, but recent arrangements 
with Telecare have increased the numbers slightly.   
Training is given to the crew who volunteered for this work that they ‘hugely enjoy’, particularly 
because they make a difference to people’s lives. It is harder with these types of calls to provide 
accurate evidence for cost effectiveness, but as discussed earlier (page 25) there is significant 
evidence that preventing falls in the elderly and avoiding fractures such as neck of femur could 
improve both mortality and morbidity in the over 65 age group.   
Calls are responded to, on average, within 17 minutes from when there call is received.  It is a 
bespoke team for falls and co-responding.      
 
 
 
  
75 
 
 
Overall summary and conclusions 
 
This evaluation has collected and/or analysed a vast amount of information and generated 
substantive primary data from the various research-streams. 
Overall, the potential for impact on patient outcomes is greatest in two key areas: 
Cardiac arrest – fire and rescue services co-responding to time-critical events like cardiac 
arrest can provide meaningful improvements in patient survival, provided staff are trained 
and are taking the appropriate action; getting on scene first is not enough by itself. 
Wider work - the qualitative data indicates strongly that there is support from staff to 
expand this work, and that there is potential need from members of the public especially 
those who may be elderly, isolated and/or vulnerable. However, there is insufficient data 
from this evaluation to estimate the net benefit. 
These findings support co-responding but we were not able to identify a single model of co-
responding which is most effective.  This report shows that co-responding to time critical events is 
associated with substantial net benefit, and it is likely that focusing on these types of incidents will 
offer the greatest value-per-incident, or cost efficiency.  Responding to a broader range of 
incidents may increase aggregate benefits, but it is not clear that the benefits of responding to 
less urgent incidents will always outweigh the costs.    
There are international examples demonstrating the effectiveness of utilising a proportion of the 
capacity within the fire and rescue services for medical response enabling earlier response to serious 
medical cases such as cardiac arrest.  This option could be expected to have the greatest positive 
impact on response time performance, an important factor for patients with serious illness or 
injuries.  It would, therefore, be likely to increase the number of lives saved (NHS Executive, 1996), 
per year; a more precise estimate may well be possible with additional research.  There are also a 
number of other potential benefits, such as drawing upon the fire and rescue services’ success with 
prevention and other aspects of collaboration (Mansfield, 2015).   
Based on the NJC incident data and the paired response single-county dataset, the fire and rescue 
services are able to reach overall incidents before ambulance services in 62% of cases, and in the 
time-critical incidents such as cardiac arrests they appear to be arriving on scene sooner than the 
ambulance services in around 93% of cases as seen in the single county paired responses.  It is 
important to note, however, that these results are not necessarily representative of all 
jurisdictions but it is a good indicator of trends.   
As noted in Research-stream A, we were unable to estimate the aggregate costs of co-responding 
due to non-reporting from many services, but Research-strand B demonstrates that the benefits of 
co-responding are substantially greater than the costs, with a return on investment of £5.67 and 
£14.40 per £1 invested.  Co-responding also appears to be highly cost-effective in terms of 
generating health gains, with a cost of £1,302 and £3,041 per quality-adjusted life year (QALY) 
gained. This is far below NICE’s threshold willingness-to-pay of £20,000 per QALY gained.  Net 
benefits were greatest for ‘time critical’ incidents, but benefits were positive and favourable even 
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when all co-responding events – including those that were not associated with survival gains – 
were considered, and in a sensitivity analysis where we doubled the costs of co-responding to 
allow for uncertainty.  In this respect, the economic justification for co-responding appears 
conclusive. 
This study has identified key areas for future evaluation which need to be considered when 
making decisions about the way forward. 
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Recommendations 
 
 Support co-responding with ambulance services to targeted cases such as cardiac arrest and 
potentially other cases that are immediately life-threatening, such as respiratory arrest, 
convulsions, severe haemorrhage (both traumatic and medical cases) and other patients at 
high risk.  
 Explore the potential to expand the work in Safe and Well checks including work in 
prevention such as slips, trips and falls; dementia awareness; and other activities. 
 Change the fire and rescue service’s incident recording system of data collection to use 
definitions and categories aligned with other databases, allowing more specific and 
sensitive analysis of patient presentations such as those used by the ambulance service.  
This would enhance any audit of responses to specific patient conditions, and would 
facilitate future collaborative research between ambulance services and fire and rescue 
services. 
 There is an argument for developing some ‘exemplar’ sites of best practice, where a strong 
commitment to research and evaluation can help drive the most effective models that 
positively influence patient care. 
 Establish work streams that can help to promote national standards in training and 
equipment, in order to reduce the danger of wasteful duplication. 
 Consider how, through mapping the mobilising arrangements, it might be feasible to reduce 
the time to fire and rescue service activation. 
 Undertake further research to include examination of definitive impact on patient 
outcomes of interventions by the fire and rescue services so as to accurately identify cost 
efficacy, as well as humanitarian benefits of the expansion of roles of fire service 
employees. 
 Collaborate with the NHS nationally and local authority public health teams to ensure that 
fire and rescue services are integrated with strategic health plans and also contribute to 
regional and local public health needs assessments and wellbeing initiatives (including Joint 
Strategic Needs Assessments). 
 Ensure that individual fire and rescue services work with local NHS Strategic Transformation 
Plans and consider if direct commissioning of fire and rescue services for co-responding and 
involvement in wider health work is the most appropriate way forward to ensure these 
activities are fully funded and embedded in appropriate clinical governance structures. 
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Appendix 1: 
Literature Review: Policy Context 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to provide a policy context for current developments, including in 
broadening the role of uniformed fire service employees. 
 
Policy context 
Key messages arising from the policy literature 
 General consensus that further blue light collaboration amongst the emergency services is 
both possible and highly desirable.   
 There are already many examples of collaboration. 
 There is no consensus on a national model for inter-service collaboration.  
 The lack of “fit” between the number and boundaries of emergency services could be a 
practical barrier to effective collaboration. 
 The LGA in particular is opposed to a statutory duty to collaborate which specifies only 
other emergency services, stating that this could stifle innovation. 
There are currently 45 fire and rescue authorities in England, consisting of six metropolitan 
authorities; 23 combined authorities; 15 county authorities; and the London Fire and Emergency 
Planning Authority (LFEPA), a body of the Greater London Authority. This compares with ten NHS 
ambulance trusts in England, and 39 territorial police forces. In Scotland there is one fire authority, 
the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service Board; alongside the single Scottish Ambulance Service and a 
single police force.  In Wales responsibility of the three fire services lies with the Welsh 
Government, and there is one ambulance trust and four police forces; whilst in Northern Ireland 
the single fire service is responsibility of the Northern Ireland Government, and there is one 
ambulance service and one police force.  
 
The current legal responsibilities of fire and rescue services are set out in the relevant Acts: 
 Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (for England and Wales) 
 Fire (Scotland) Act 2005  
 The Fire and Rescue Services (Northern Ireland) Order 2006.   
 
But they can be summarised as follows: 
 
 Responding to fires, road traffic accidents, and other emergencies 
 Contributing to national resilience (collectively being able to respond to up to four 
simultaneous national-level emergencies) 
 Undertaking preventative activities to reduce the risk of fire 
 Carrying out safety inspections of business premises. 
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Fire Statistics 
The number of fires has been falling steadily for at least the last 15 years. Fire Statistics for 
England 2014/15 (Home Office Statistical Bulletin 08/16) show that there were about 496,000 
incidents attended by fire and rescue services in 2014/15, compared with 1,016,000 incidents 
attended in 2003/04.  Similarly, in Wales between 2005/06 and 2014/15 incidents dropped from 
53,000 to 36,000; and in Scotland they dropped from 104,000 in 2009/10 (the earliest for which 
this equivalent data is available) to 85,000 in 2014/15.  
This fall can be attributed to a variety of causes, including better building standards, foam filled 
furniture regulations6, greater safety of electrical and gas devices used in the home, and effective 
work by fire and rescue services to improve public knowledge of fire and related risks and to help 
vulnerable people manage their risks more effectively. 
However, there are some reasons to think that in future this trend could stop or go into reverse.  
Among the reasons why this might happen are: climate change, and a consequent increased 
frequency of natural disasters including flooding; and increasing poor safety standards as a result 
of overcrowding in domestic premises (frequently in Houses of Multiple Occupation (HMOs) in the 
private rented sector).  
Funding of Fire and Rescue Services 
In common with all local authorities, fire authorities have recently faced large reductions in 
funding.  In England the National Audit Office (NAO) estimates that between 2010-11 and 2015-16, 
funding for stand-alone fire authorities fell on average by 28% (National Audit Office 2015).  Once 
council tax and other income is taken into account, stand-alone authorities received an average 
reduction in total income (‘spending power’) of 17% in real terms.   Similarly, in Scotland, the 
Scottish Fire and Rescue Services budget has been reduced by 31 per cent in real terms against the 
2012/13 budget of its predecessor eight regional brigades (Audit Scotland, 2015); and Wales and 
Northern Ireland Fire Services have also seen reductions. 
As a result, UK fire authorities are working to reconfigure their services to make efficiencies with 
minimum impacts, particularly on emergency response configuration and on response times.  In 
general, when making budget reduction decisions, fire authorities have tended to protect 
appliances, but reduced numbers of firefighters and other staff and, recently, reduced the number 
of fire stations. The NAO reports that, in England , “Fire control, non-uniform and senior firefighter 
managerial posts have seen the largest reductions in numbers, but numbers of non-managerial 
whole-time firefighters have reduced by around 14% from 2010-11 to 2014-15”. Scottish Fire and 
Rescue Service (2016) statistics also demonstrate reductions in numbers of staff and stations in 
recent years; while the Welsh Government (2016) statistics show the number of stations has 
remained roughly similar to the early 2000s, but the number of operational staff has reduced. 
Impact on Fire Prevention Activities 
The NAO reports that fire and rescue services in England have reduced their prevention and 
protection activities, but that there is little evidence on how this might affect the future number of 
fires and other emergencies.  The NAO estimated that audits and inspections fell by 30% from 
                                                     
6 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1988/1324/contents/made 
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2010-11 to 2014-15, and personnel hours spent on home fire safety visits and other fire risk 
checks fell by 27%.  Figures from Wales show that hours spent on community fire safety activity 
has also reduced since the late 2000s, although it is still much higher than in the early 2000s.  In 
Scotland, however, the personnel hours spent on home fire safety visits since 2010-11 has 
increased by 36%, according to Scottish Fire and Rescue Service (2016) statistics.   
Collaboration between Emergency Services 
Sir Ken Knight (then the Government’s Chief Fire Adviser) was commissioned by the previous 
Government to report on the future of the fire service in England.  His report, “Facing the Future” 
(2013), considered reducing the number of fire services through merger and co-working with 
ambulance services.  It also suggested further major change options, including merging fire and 
rescue services with other blue light services; sharing governance structures with other blue light 
services; and improving co-ordination between Government departments with an interest in fire 
and rescue functions.  
 
The Emergency Services Collaboration Working Group published a report (2014) “Emergency 
Services Collaboration – the current picture”.  The working group included senior members of the 
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives (AACE), Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), 
Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC), College of Policing, Chief Fire Officers 
Association (CFOA) and the Local Government Association (LGA) on behalf of fire authorities.  The 
report identified a number of examples of collaborative working already in existence, including 
combined fire and police stations in Norfolk and Suffolk; and a new combined police and fire 
training facility in County Durham.  
In September 2015, DCLG, the Department of Health and the Home Office issued a consultation 
document on closer working between the emergency services in England.  The document 
discussed the potential for further “blue light collaboration” and proposed a new duty on all three 
emergency services actively to consider collaboration opportunities with one another to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness.  Similarly, in spring 2016 the Scottish Government consulted on the 
Fire and Rescue Framework for Scotland 2016, in which they outlined their expectations that “The 
Scottish fire and rescue service should continue to investigate options for sharing premises, assets 
and services with partners, including Police Scotland and the Scottish Ambulance Service where it 
could help protect public service provision within a community or contribute to better local or 
national outcomes.”  The Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service are currently consulting on a 
proposal to “explore opportunities for collaborative working with Health & Social Care (HSC) 
Services”. 
 
On 1 October 2015, NHS England, Public Health England, the Fire and Rescue Service, Age UK and 
the Local Government Association published a “Consensus” document  (NHS England et al 2015) 
setting out how the organisations would work together to encourage local action to prevent or 
minimise service demand and improve the quality of life of people with long term conditions.  
Firefighters across the country will aim to carry out more ‘Safe and Well Checks’ in people’s homes 
when they visit, extending the existing home safety checks (which number about 670,000 a year) 
into a ‘Safe and Well’ visit to support vulnerable people and those with complex conditions, by 
reducing fire risks and aiming to minimise health risks such as falls, loneliness and isolation.  This is 
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intended to reduce visits to Accident and Emergency departments, and the incidence of broken 
hips and depression. 
 
In 2015-16 the DCLG distributed £75 million to English fire authorities through a Fire 
Transformation Fund7, which could be used to set up fire stations to be jointly used with other 
“blue light” services.  
 
An example of current collaboration between emergency services is a joint project of Surrey Fire 
and Rescue (Surrey fire and rescue service), East Sussex fire and rescue service, West Sussex fire 
and rescue service, and South East Coast Ambulance Service (Surrey County Council, 2015). Early 
deliverable projects between emergency services in Surrey have gained national recognition, with 
Surrey partners being presented the Gold Award for ‘Working Together’ at the Improvement and 
Efficiency Social Enterprise (iESE) in March 2016.    
 
In September 2015, through the auspices of the NJC, Surrey Fire and Rescue Service launched a 
county-wide trial co-responder scheme under which South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS 
Foundation Trust (SECAmb) can request deployment of the fire service personnel to particular 
health emergencies in the community, such as cardiac arrests. The co-responding trial has 
provided over 300 Surrey fire and rescue service personnel with training in emergency and trauma 
care skills. Additional medical equipment, including defibrillators, has been provided on all fire 
engines, managers’ cars and four wheel drive vehicles.   
 
Under the separate ’wider work trial’, Surrey fire and rescue service has taken on responsibility 
from Surrey Police to respond to calls from SECAmb to gain entry to properties where there is a 
concern for the safety of the occupant.  Surrey fire and rescue service is able to respond within 10 
minutes on average, can usually gain access with less damage to property and can free police 
resources for other urgent calls.  The missing person’s pilot scheme allows Surrey fire and rescue 
service and SECAmb to help the police search for high risk missing people, who are often the very 
young, very old or those with a potential mental capacity issue.  
 
Mergers of Fire and Rescue Services 
From 1st April 2013, a single national Scottish fire and rescue service was formed as the result of 
an amalgamation of eight fire services in Scotland.  There have been two recent mergers of fire 
and rescue services in England: between Devon and Somerset fire and rescue services in April 
2007, and Dorset and Wiltshire in 2016. Some fire and rescue services have combined control 
centres: West Midlands and Staffordshire; Cambridge and Suffolk; East and West Sussex and the 
North West Fire Control which covers Greater Manchester, Lancashire, Cumbria and Cheshire. 
 
 
                                                     
7 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fire-and-rescue-authority-transformation-funds-for-2015-to-2016-
bids 
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Conclusions 
The following conclusions are supported by the evidence cited in this section:  
 
 The number of fires and other emergencies has been falling, but could start to rise again in 
future. 
 The number of other emergencies for which the fire and rescue service have at least partial 
responsibility is likely to rise, particularly those associated with climate change such as 
flooding. 
 Collaboration between fire and rescue services and other blue light services has wide 
support inside the fire community, in other emergency services and in Governments, and 
there are some important examples of collaborative working at both leadership and service 
delivery level. 
 
What key players are saying 
Current Blue Light Collaboration 
AACE, ACPO and CFOA produced a joint statement on blue light collaboration in the United 
Kingdom (February 2014). They agreed that:  
 
 All three organisations are keen to support innovative approaches to service delivery.  
 They welcomed the Government’s commitment to ‘improved integration of local 
emergency services’ and the debate this opens regarding a more coordinated approach to 
the delivery of blue light services. 
 They supported the Government’s commitment to a local approach in public service 
provision, and said that emergency services should have the freedom to integrate and 
collaborate in a way that meets local needs.  “Any attempt to integrate services without a 
sound evidence base may meet with fierce local opposition”. 
 The emergency services would work to remove barriers to change and help ensure that all 
emergency services are informed of the costs and benefits of various models.  
 They would encourage the sharing of estate wherever this is practical. 
 They would explore how fire and rescue services and police might contribute further in 
terms of co-responding with the ambulance service. 
 They would build on the existing levels of joint emergency service training and exercising 
which takes place on a local, regional and national level. 
 Both ACPO and CFOA recognised “the paramount need for the Ambulance service to 
remain an integral part of the NHS where it will play an increasing role in the provision of 
Urgent and Emergency care”. 
Importantly, at the Fire Brigades Union Conference in the following May 2015, the union members 
themselves voted to change their previous policy position, which was to oppose co-responder and 
first-responder schemes being introduced in an ad hoc manner at local level.  Instead, they agreed 
to continue the discussion at national level on emergency medical response, and engage in trials 
subject to NJC approval (Fire Brigades Union, 2015a). 
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Then AACE produced a report in September 2015 titled “A vision for the ambulance service: ‘2020 
and beyond’ and the steps to its realisation”.  The document did not include any specific reference 
to collaboration with other emergency services.  However, it did provide a relevant description of 
different broad categories of ambulance service work into the future, including: navigation and 
coordination (single 999 and 111 clinical hub); diagnostics; and, where required treatment and 
transport.  
The document also states that: “Delivery of care within the home environment will increasingly 
become the norm for the ambulance service with a vast reduction in hospital conveyances; 
transport will cease to be the default option for clinicians.  The advancement in Paramedic training 
and enhanced skills sets will ensure this can be achieved safely and competently and to the benefit 
of patients and their families”. 
Individual ambulance services have produced more detailed summaries of the extent and future of 
collaboration between emergency services. For example, Adrian Healey, Head of Tri Service 
Development for the South Western Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust, presented to the 
LGA Fire Service Conference on 9 March 2016 (Healey, 2016).  He reported 45 volunteer-based co-
responder schemes across the region (with five more schemes in development); joint service 
estate sites, including dispatch points and fleet workshops and a tri-service station.  He predicted 
future estate strategy alignment between services; expansion of tri-service response; Paramedic 
integration; regional Emergency Service forums; and joint community support and prevention 
schemes.  However, he also pointed out practical issues that might affect collaborative efforts.  For 
example, his Trust is required to deal with six fire and rescue services, five police services and 12 
Clinical Commissioning Groups. 
Government Consultation on Emergency Services Collaboration (England) and Subsequent 
Proposals  
The Government in England’s September 2015 consultation document generated 318 responses.  
The largest group responding to the consultation were representatives from the fire and rescue 
service, who contributed over a third of responses, followed by representatives from the police 
who contributed over a fifth of all responses.  Ambulance services contributed 3% of responses.  
These proportions at least partly reflect the relative numbers of discrete organisations in each 
emergency service. On 26 January 2016, the Government published its response to the 
consultation “Enabling closer working between the Emergency Services - Summary of consultation 
responses and next steps”. 
Some key responses to the consultation and next steps document are summarised below.  
The LGA consultation response (2015a) stated that fire and rescue servicess have already been at 
the forefront of developing collaborative arrangements between emergency services, both in 
relation to co-responding and joint work on prevention, and the provision of back office services 
and the co-location of crews and vehicles at shared sites.  The LGA also stated that: “increasingly 
FRAs are collaborating with wider health partners than just the ambulance service.  A growing 
number of fire and rescue services like Kent and Humberside are supporting health and social care 
interventions by providing, for example, comprehensive checks in the home to identify, in 
particular, elderly or vulnerable people.  Fire and rescue service teams working in this way are 
installing cold alarms alongside smoke alarms in the homes of elderly people living alone so they 
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can be supported if the temperature dips below a certain level.  This work saves lives, helps to keep 
people healthy, tackles growing levels of obesity and reduces hospital admissions.”  
The LGA concluded that: “putting in place a duty to collaborate on fire and rescue services with just 
the other emergency services is likely to provide a constraint that stifles innovation and broader 
collaboration.  In the LGA’s view the provision of incentives, like transformation funding, is more 
likely to produce greater collaboration between the emergency services…”. 
The Fire Brigade’s Union response to the Government consultation (Fire Brigades Union, 2015b) 
listed five key areas for the development of fire and rescue services’ future work (suggesting that 
none fit with the proposed transfer of responsibility to Police and Crime Commissioners).  These 
are already being progressed by the NJC: emergency medical response; multi agency emergency 
response to terrorism; environmental challenges; youth and other social engagement work; and 
inspections and enforcement.  
The response also stated that: “Emergency medical response is probably the greatest contribution 
firefighters might make to promoting innovation and greater collaboration in public services at 
present… The FBU believes that the integration of firefighters into the health agenda potentially 
represents a win-win outcome for both services and more importantly, a qualitative improvement 
in services to the public. The union has seen examples internationally, such as in some cities in the 
United States, where this system works well for both those who need medical services and the 
workforce who provide it.” 
CFOA (2016) stated that: “Fire and rescue services already work closely with colleagues from the 
emergency services – for example over a third of UK fire and rescue services are already co-
responding with ambulance colleagues – and we will take steps to ensure this best practice is 
recognised, shared and replicated where possible….   
“CFOA is pleased that the government will be maintaining the principle of local determination over 
governance changes, and we are keen that fire and rescue services do not lose their important links 
to local government, the NHS and other organisations which enable services to make an important 
wider social contribution….” 
Conclusions 
 There appears to be a consensus among the senior management and national 
representatives of the three emergency services that further blue light collaboration is 
both possible and highly desirable.  This includes: joint delivery of preventative 
programmes; co-location; and specific service developments such as the provision of some 
emergency medical services by firefighters. 
 There are already existing successful local examples of collaboration. 
 There is no consensus on a national model for inter-service collaboration. The preference is 
for local solutions based on detailed examination of local circumstances. 
 The lack of “fit” between the number and boundaries of emergency services could be a 
practical barrier to effective collaboration; there is a general expectation that further 
mergers of fire and rescue services will take place. 
 The LGA in particular is opposed to a statutory duty to collaborate which specifies only 
other emergency services, stating that this could stifle innovation. 
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 The Government has not ensured that collaboration is pursued in any systematic way, and 
proposed changes in governance arrangements (which require a local case to be made in 
each instance) combined with budget reductions could make effective collaboration more 
difficult to achieve.    
Literature Review: Research Evidence 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to examine the existing research and evaluations which may offer 
potential evidence of the effectiveness of activities to broaden the role of uniformed fire service 
employees.   
A Note on Cost Benefit Analyses and Incentives for Change 
The concept of cost benefit analysis in relation to public service reform is not straightforward.  In 
particular, the questions of where the benefits of a particular reform may accrue and how they 
can be properly quantified are important when considering what incentives there are on individual 
actors to fund or implement the reform.  
In some cases, “benefits” from a specific service change or development may accrue directly to 
the organisation that carries out the relevant actions or service.  For example, a local authority will 
typically keep the proceeds of fines from relevant parking and traffic offences to cover the cost of 
providing the service and, if a surplus, other transport-related issues. Therefore the authority may 
benefit financially, even if it faces additional costs from funding enforcement activity.   
In other cases, the local authority will not directly benefit, for example if it increases enforcement 
activity against retailers selling illicit tobacco.  The government may benefit from increased 
tobacco tax receipts, and society as a whole may benefit if consumption of illicit tobacco falls.  
However, there is no direct financial incentive for the local authority to increase its enforcement 
activity in this area.   
 
There is good evidence (included in the next section of this report) to show that the fitting of 
smoke alarms as part of a home fire safety programme reduces the financial impact of damage 
from domestic fires (as well as reducing deaths and serious injuries).  The financial benefits accrue 
to victims of fire, to the NHS and social care system.  Home fire safety visits can be seen to support 
independent living, and to some degree benefit wider society, because, for example, of a 
consequent reduction in insurance premiums and a reduction in work absence.  This does not 
necessarily create an incentive for fire and rescue services to devote additional resources to such 
visits.  The same consideration might apply to home safety visits that extend beyond fire safety to 
include issues like falls.   
 
In some cases, for example the promotion of public health, the benefits of a particular policy or 
service development may be hard to quantify in financial terms.  Health economists use various 
techniques to attempt this – typically the concept of Quality Adjusted Life Years – but all are 
subject to significant methodological objections.  In addition, while a successful public health 
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intervention such as an effective falls programme may save specific costs (for example, the costs 
to the NHS of treating injuries), it may also increase other social costs (for example, from treating 
chronic diseases associated with greater longevity). Even where there is a direct benefit, it may 
take the form of slowing the rate of increase of demand for a service rather than in directly 
reduced costs, and this may be hard to quantify.  
 
It is therefore necessary to consider where the costs and benefits of proposed developments in 
services offered by fire and rescue service would fall, and how net benefits can be quantified.  
 
Research evidence 
The research review yielded articles describing and evaluating projects in the following areas: 
 Home safety/fire safety/risk management/falls prevention 
 First responding/co-responding/collaboration between fire and ambulance/emergency 
medical services 
 Studies of implementation issues such as training, protocols, culture and staff attitudes. 
The key findings from the studies cited in this section are: 
 Very few studies address cost effectiveness. 
 There is good evidence for clinical effectiveness of co-responding schemes, where fire 
service staff assist with basic life support skills such as defibrillation and improve response 
times. 
 Other studies show no improvement to clinical effectiveness. The reasons for this were 
various and included 
o skills such as chest compressions not being applied optimally 
o failure to use automated external defibrillation (AED) even when first on scene 
o no extra benefit from an additional first responder scheme where an effective one 
was already in place 
 Building on good evidence of fire and rescue services’ existing role in fire prevention, there 
has been discussion and some study of involvement in falls prevention, although no 
previous studies, as yet, of effectiveness of such schemes; and of fire service involvement 
in heart attack education and in dementia awareness.  
 Several studies throw some light on the issues faced in implementing these schemes and 
cover several aspects of service organisation:  
o Choosing which calls are appropriate for first responders 
o Organisation of emergency dispatch functions 
o Staff training and education 
o Communication and leadership 
o Collaboration across organisations. 
Cost effectiveness studies 
Two studies outside the UK assess the cost benefit and cost effectiveness of dual responding and 
first responding. One from Sweden (Sund et al, 2012) and another from Canada (Jermyn, 2009) 
found that extra lives were saved and estimated the cost of achieving that. Sund found the cost 
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per quality-adjusted life year (QALY) was estimated at €13,000 and the cost per saved life was 
€60,000. Jermyn calculated a cost per life saved in an urban area was CAD 7,000 and the cost per 
life saved in the rural area was CAD 49,000.  
Clinical effectiveness 
Positive findings of clinical effectiveness of first responder schemes 
Several studies have found improved outcomes for patients attended by first responders, 
including fire department first responders (Nordberg et al, 2015; Hansen et al, 2015);  
 
Positive findings of clinical effectiveness is associated with the Fire Service assisting the emergency 
medical services crew with cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) efforts (Hollenberg et al, 2009) 
and the fire crew arriving first (MacDonald et al, 2009; Hoyer and Christensen, 2009). White et al 
(2005), set in Minnesota, USA and Van Alem et al (2003) found no difference in survival rates for 
patients attended by different professional groups, reflecting that it is the time to definitive 
treatment that is crucial, rather than the profession of the individuals providing it.  
Speed of response 
Speed of response can make a crucial difference to outcome in cases of serious and life 
threatening illness and injury. It can therefore be regarded as a proxy for better outcomes. Several 
studies that do not address clinical effectiveness do identify better response times as a benefit of 
first responder schemes (Lerner et al, 2003a; Smith et al, 2001a; Boyle et al, 2010; and Saner et al, 
2013). 
Neutral or negative findings on clinical effectiveness of first responding 
There are also several studies that found no positive effect on clinical outcomes. 
Boland et al (2015) assess the value of the dispatch of advanced life support (ALS) firefighters in 
Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA.  Firefighters used one or more of their advanced skills in just 7.6% 
of the cases where they arrived first.  The clinical value of the interventions remained unknown 
and there was some evidence of suboptimal chest compressions and AED use.  The authors 
concluded that the emphasis should be on consistent application of basic life support skills in the 
responders who arrive first on scene. Confirming the importance of early defibrillation, Lerner et al 
(2009) describe failure of first responders to deploy AEDs in 42% of cases.   
Sayre et al (2005) assessed a scheme in which police vehicles were equipped with AEDs, but where 
survival to discharge was similar in both the intervention and control groups, leading to the 
conclusion that where there was already a fire department first responder scheme in place the 
addition of police first responders did not make a difference. 
Other health interventions 
The Fire Service’s role in fire prevention is well established and addressed widely in the literature 
(Ta et al, 2006; Diekman et al, 2010; Arch et al, 2012; Clare et al, 2012; Gielen et al, 2013; Istre et 
al, 2013; Lehna et al, 2015). Pirrallo et al (2004), Diamond-Smith et al (2014) and Craig et al (2015), 
are the only economic evaluations revealed in the searches, which found savings in terms of less 
damage to property, lives saved and fires prevented respectively.  
There are many cases of this approach being extended into other areas of safety and health. 
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Laybourne et al (2011) argue that an effective community partnership model for falls prevention 
could lead to shared costs, increased participation by a range of people and organisations, cross-
fertilisation of ideas, (for example combining the fire service’s risk prevention approach with the 
health promotion focus of the NHS) and enhanced co-ordination and co-operation between 
agencies.  But there have been few studies that actually test the effectiveness of such schemes. 
Our search revealed just one, Weiss et al (2003), which confirms that emergency medical services 
can collect data to predict older people’s risk of falls and identify people for whom intervention 
would be helpful. 
We found two examples of other interventions. 
Meischke et al (2004, 2006) describe a randomized trial in which heart attack survival kits, 
including advice on calling 911 and use of aspirin in cases of chest pain, were provided in a door-
to-door home intervention in King County, Washington, USA.  The seniors who had received the 
advice were more likely to call for chest pain and to have taken aspirin. 
Harfleet (2014) in a news article, describes a community outreach initiative in Kent UK in which 
firefighters were trained as dementia friends8 in order to be more responsive to individuals with 
dementia when undertaking community safety activities. 
Implementation Issues 
Dispatch criteria 
A small number of international studies have attempted to determine which calls are appropriate 
for attendance by fire crews. Craig et al (2010) describe the selection of a sub-set of Medical 
Priority Dispatch (MPDS)9 determinants. Funk et al (2002) found that 93% of fire department 
responses to motor vehicle crashes in Albany, New York did not require a complex extrication, 
suggesting that fire vehicles should not automatically be dispatched to such calls. Key et al (2003) 
concluded that firefighters could go to certain 911 calls in place of ambulances with no adverse 
outcomes.  
 
Training and education 
Walker et al (2005) examined the training and protocols for management of burn injuries by the 
UK fire service.  UK Chief Fire Officers were surveyed for Lee and Porter (2007) and for Quinn et al 
(2009) in order to establish what levels of medical skills were taught to firefighters.  All three 
studies found considerable variation and a lack of standardisation. 
Cone et al (2001) found that basic life support crews in a US emergency medical services system 
cancelled advanced life support crews inappropriately in 77% of cases, underlining the importance 
of developing operational protocols appropriate to the level of training of those attending calls. 
Williams et al (2011) reviewed emergency medical services provision in nine US states in order to 
identify differences in scope of practice and any factors that might be influencing those.  Services 
surveyed included combined fire and emergency medical services as well as emergency medical 
                                                     
8 https://www.dementiafriends.org.uk/ 
 
9 The Advanced Medical Priority Dispatch System (AMPDS) was until recently the standard system used by UK 
Ambulance Services although several now use NHS Pathways as their clinical triage system 
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services-only.  The study found that rural services were more likely to authorise interventions than 
urban services. The presence of a medical director was associated with a higher likelihood of 
authorising some types of interventions.  
Smith et al (2001b and 2002) looked at the personal and professional impact on firefighters of 
participating in Melbourne’s first responder scheme and the first twelve months of operation of 
the service.  It found a number of positive messages and also some pointers to implementing 
similar projects elsewhere in terms of communication and support from managers within the fire 
service. The need to maintain firefighters’ knowledge and confidence is also identified, given that 
the skills were used rarely. 
Success factors in developing new initiatives 
Henderson et al (2010) described an arson prevention programme, and identified the importance 
of sharing knowledge across/between services through education and consultation, including 
deliberate approaches to breaking down cultural barriers between very different groups of 
professionals with different cultures. 
Elmqvist et al (2010) asked fire and police personnel to describe their experiences of being first on 
scene at traumatic incidents, which include experiencing strong emotions while needing to be 
calm in response to others’ expectations. These are experiences that it is important to help people 
prepare for and deal with.  
Lerner et al (2003b) reported on a survey of US and Canadian firefighters’ attitudes to involvement 
in an AED programme.  Reportedly two-thirds of respondents were “very comfortable” using AEDs 
and only 3% felt “very uncomfortable”. 
Conclusions 
 Provision of basic life support, including defibrillation, by first/co-responders is associated 
with quicker response times and if response times improve, so potentially can outcomes 
for patients experiencing out of hospital cardiac arrest if they are appropriate for 
defibrillation. 
 Evidence for training fire crews in advanced life support skills is sparse and suggest it may 
not be the best way forward. 
 Evidence for cost-benefit or cost effectiveness of first and/or co-responders is limited and 
based in other countries with different emergency system design which may create issues 
of transferability. 
 There is good evidence for the effectiveness of fire prevention schemes, including 
examples of cost-effectiveness studies. 
 There is some evidence for potential impact of firefighter interventions in other areas of 
safety and health. 
 
Evidence on implementation issues also suggests a number of conclusions: 
 Clarity on treatment protocols is important and there may be value in considering a 
consistent standard between services, although geographical differences may be logical 
because of different travel times to hospital in urban and rural areas. 
 Care should be taken not to over-estimate the knowledge or skills of personnel. 
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 In the small number of studies that have examined staff attitudes to new roles, most 
found that staff responded positively to the opportunities, seeing them as valuable 
professional development. 
 In implementation, attention must be given to good communication with staff and 
provision of appropriate support, particularly where staff will be responding to traumatic 
incidents. 
 Where schemes involve cooperation between professionals in different organisations 
with different cultures, time must be set aside to help staff develop knowledge of and 
trust in each other’s contributions. 
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Appendix 2: Survival advantage by fire and rescue services’ and ambulance services’ response times 
 
 
 + Additional ambulance response minutes 
fire and rescue 
service 
Response 
minutes 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12+ 
1 0.0% 5.0% 9.3% 13.0% 16.1% 18.6% 20.6% 22.2% 23.5% 24.5% 25.3% 26.0% 26.0% 
2 0.0% 4.3% 8.0% 11.1% 13.6% 15.6% 17.2% 18.5% 19.5% 20.3% 21.0% 21.0% 21.0% 
3 0.0% 3.7% 6.8% 9.3% 11.3% 12.9% 14.2% 15.2% 16.0% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 
4 0.0% 3.1% 5.6% 7.6% 9.2% 10.5% 11.5% 12.3% 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 
5 0.0% 2.5% 4.5% 6.1% 7.4% 8.4% 9.2% 9.9% 9.9% 9.9% 9.9% 9.9% 9.9% 
6 0.0% 2.0% 3.6% 4.9% 5.9% 6.7% 7.4% 7.4% 7.4% 7.4% 7.4% 7.4% 7.4% 
7 0.0% 1.6% 2.9% 3.9% 4.7% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 
8 0.0% 1.3% 2.3% 3.1% 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 
9 0.0% 1.0% 1.8% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 
10 0.0% 0.8% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 
11 0.0% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 
12+ 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
Adapted from De Maio et al. Annals of Emergency Medicine. 2003; 42(2): 242-250. 
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Appendix 3: Cost calculations 
 
 Crew Avg crew Unit cost 1 Disturbance fee Cost per incident Source 
 Retained duty crew 3.8 £13.53 £3.90 £14.88 A 
       
 Medical supplies Cost Qty  Cost per incident  
 Philips Heartstart FR3 semi automatic defibrillator  £1,975.00 145 events/year x 5yrs £2.73 B 
 Primary battery for Philips HeartStart FR3  £203.00 300 shocks/battery £0.68 C 
 Philips Heartstart FR3 smart pads x5  £162.00 5 pads £32.40 D 
 Fast response kit £51.00 1 per incident £51.00 E 
     £86.80  
 Call-out costs % Cost/hr Hours/call Cost per incident  
 Hire - Aerial Rescue Pump  0% £285.00 1.00 £285.00 F 
 Hire - Aerial Ladder Platform  51% £274.00 1.00 £274.00 F 
 Hire - Pumping Appliance (incl. Rescue Pumps) 32% £262.00 1.00 £262.00 F 
 Hire – Light Vehicles  17% £47.00 1.00 £47.00 F 
 AVERAGE 100% £232.18 1.00 £232.18  
       
 Training Cost/FF FF/incident Events/6mons/FF Cost per incident  
 Initial training 2 £368.00    G 
 6-month requalification £115.00    G 
 Annual cost £280.60 3.8 72 £14.72  
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 TOTAL COST PER INCIDENT      
 Retained duty crew    £350.34  
 Whole time crew    £284.11  
       
 Assumptions      
1 Assumes whole time salary costs are independent of co-responding  
2 Assumes an initially trained FF continues to co-respond for 5 years 
 
 
Sources 
 
A https://www.fbu.org.uk/pay-rates/pay-settlement-2016 
B http://www.stjohnsupplies.co.uk/products/Defibrillators/Defibrillators/Philips-Heartstart-FR3-semi-automatic-defibrillator-with-text-display 
C http://www.stjohnsupplies.co.uk/products/Defibrillators/Accessories/Primary-battery-for-Philips-HeartStart-FR3-defibrillator 
D http://www.stjohnsupplies.co.uk/products/Defibrillators/Accessories/FR3-Smart-Pads-5-Sets 
E http://www.stjohnsupplies.co.uk/products/Defibrillators/Accessories/Fast-response-kit-for-Philips-HeartStart-FR3-defibrillator 
F  http://www.firescotland.gov.uk/media/542248/140130_charging_policy.pdf 
G NJC Fire Evaluation Survey 
 
